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ABSTRACT 
Evaluation Framework for Software Security Requirements Engineering Tools 
In software development requirements are considered as building blocks of software system, 
which also are considered to be responsible in event of failure. Bad requirements can lead to 
software features that are not to the specifications. For that reason requirement gathering process 
is considered as the most sensitive and complicated process among all software engineering 
lifecycle processes. In current age where cyber-attacks are common security requirements also 
comes into place and plays a very important role in software development process. In order to 
elicit security requirements new type of tools are begin to form a shape called security 
engineering tools which help in eliciting security requirements. That considered being the most 
efficient way of eliciting security requirements. Moreover these tools empower users with 
artifacts specifically to cater security needs, which save time and efforts for engineers in return. 
Nevertheless these tools are still at their infantry and are lacking mass adoption by software 
security engineers. Reason because these tools have steep learning curve which can add-up to 
development time and end up pushing more cost to the project. In order to decide which tool to 
select for a particular project require engineers to use these tools which in return will consume 
tremendous amount of time. Moreover using unstructured tool selection process can also leads to 
wrong tool selection which will be the waste of time and efforts. In this research work we are 
going to construct structured approach which will help engineers in security engineering tool 
selection process. In order to aid this process analysts and architects will be able to rate the 
features they want the most in a particular security engineering tool. In return from this process 
they will be able to choose between security engineering tools and select the best one. Finally 
using approach constructed in this research work will save time, efforts, and costs.  In our 
approach we will analyze security engineering processes, methods and tools, to construct a 
framework that will help aid engineers in security engineering tool evaluation process.  
Key Words: Security, requirements, engineering, tools 
Hindamisraamistik tarkvara turvalisusnõuete tööriistade jaoks 
Tarkvaraarenduses on nõuded kui süsteemi vundament, mis vastutavad ka ebaõnnestumiste 
eest. Valed nõuded võivad viia tarkvara eripäradeni, mis tegelikult ei vasta spetsifikatsioonidele. 
Sel põhjusel peetakse nõuete koostamist kõige keerulisemaks ja olulisemaks sammuks 
tarkvaraarenduse elutsükli kõikide protsesside jooksul. Tänapäeval, kus küberrünnakud on 
tavalised, mängivad turvalisuse nõuded väga olulist rolli tarkvaraarenduse protsessis. On levimas 
uut tüüpi tööriistad, mille kasutamist peetakse kõige efektiivsemaks meetodiks turvalisusnõuete 
väljatöötamisel. Lisaks võimaldavad need tööriistad lahendada turvalisusega seotud 
küsimusi kasutajal endal, hoides märgatavalt kokku inseneride aega. Siiski on nende tööriistade 
areng alles algstaadiumis ning neid ei ole tarkvarainseneride poolt massiliselt kasutusele võetud. 
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Põhjus on väga pikas uue tarkvara õppimise ja  sellega kohanemise protsessis, mis põhjustab 
ajakadu arendusprotsessis ning lisab projektile kulusid. Projekti jaoks konkreetse tööriista 
valimisel võib tutvumine ja katsetamine võtta inseneridel hulgaliselt aega. Lisaks sellele võib 
struktureerimata valikuprotsess viia vale tööriista kasutuselevõtmisele, mis raiskab omakorda 
kõigi aega ja pingutusi. Selles uurimuses kavatseme me koostada struktureeritud lähenemise, mis 
aitab insenere turvalisusnõuete tööriistade valimisel. Protsessile kaasaaitamiseks saavad 
analüütikud ja arhitektid hinnata tarkvara omadusi, mida nad enda seisukohast olulisimateks 
peavad. Sellest lähtuvalt saavad nad valida kindlate tööriistade vahel ning teha parima valiku. 
Antud uurimustöös kontstrueeritud lähenemisega on võimalik säästa aega, vaeva ja kulutusi. 
Uurimuse koostamise käigus uurime me tarkvaraarenduse turvaprotsesse, meetodeid ja tööriistu 
ning püüame luua raamistikku, mis oleks inseneridele turvalisusnõuete tööriistade hindamisel 
abiks 
Võtmesõnad: 
Turvalisus, nõuded, masinaehitus, töövahendid
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Introduction  
Software requirements are the foundation of any software system. As such similar to the building 
and construction requires a base, requirements play same utmost importance in developing 
software systems. Unlike developers of 80’s now a day’s software architects are more aware of 
this phenomenon that, success of any software project relies on complete, concrete and concise 
requirements. One of the major factors contributing to the requirements is security engineering. 
In current age of cyber warfare, discussing about requirements without discussing security 
constraints may lead to loss of valuable assets like information, methodology, and business 
workflow. In some critical cases may lead to loss of human life, such of the examples can be 
learnt from the fact that software systems are now part of human society. Power, healthcare, 
education, governments, military and telecommunications almost all social sectors are now 
becoming part of a giant cloud (internet). 
These elements take software architects and analysts attention to the methods, tools, and 
languages available for security requirements which can help illustrate the software system in 
terms of possible vulnerabilities. However available tools for security requirements are already 
on their infantry. And there is no customary procedure that provides standard framework support 
for deciding which security requirements elicitation tool to choose. In this research we will 
analyze some processes and tools to construct a framework that will support and accelerate SRE 
tool decision making process.  
1.1. Motivation 
“The role of security requirements is to provide information about the actual needs of a system or 
application with respect to security in order to accomplish its business goals” (Braz, et al., 2008). 
Common agenda of eliciting security requirements in early stages of lifecycle is to reduce 
increasing costs for the later stages. Although fixing bug from a developed software system will 
be more costly, than avoiding vulnerabilities at the beginning of development lifecycle. So the 
relevant question to ask at this point is: how to reduce these vulnerabilities? There could be 
several solutions towards addressing vulnerabilities, but in most cases assessing vulnerabilities 
could be a difficult task, and keeping track of risks and threats could also be a challenging task. 
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This can be achieved by using requirements engineering tools, but the fact that these are software 
requirements specific and does not provide security requirements artifacts can lead to missing or 
inappropriate security requirements. The appropriate solution for eliciting security requirements 
will be to use security requirements elicitation tools.  
Security engineering tools are the software tools that help accelerate security requirements 
elicitation process. One similar definition in this context is of requirements engineering tools as 
discussed: “Requirements engineering (RE) tools are software tools which provide automated 
assistance during the RE process and support the RE activities” (Matulevičius, 2005). Similar to 
RE tools SE tools also provide the functionality of documenting, validating, and analyzing the 
security requirements.  
One of the benefit of using SE tools is it reduces the possibility of eliciting unclear or ambiguous 
security requirements. Moreover the use of RE tool for eliciting security requirements is not that 
inferior as well. While SE tools were not readily available a decade ago, analysts and architects 
were forced to follow traditional approach in eliciting security requirements, i.e. use of RE tools. 
However not using standard SE tool can create possibility of capturing unwanted, unclear, or 
ambiguous security requirement, which in result will leave vulnerabilities into the software 
system. 
1.2. Scope  
Among several security engineering tools, deciding on which tool to choose can be time 
consuming and efforts adding process. Also all the available tools use variant approaches that 
can add to the learning curve as well. In this research work we will construct a method that will 
address the issue of choosing security requirements engineering tool. We keep our scope limited 
to analyzing security assurance processes (discussed in chapter 3) and security engineering tools 
(discussed in chapter 4). First will be to analyze the security assurance processes that will give us 
our core requirements, these will be used to test the security engineering tools, and provide us 
with the means or functionality that has been fulfilled from a particular requirement. On the basis 
of means we will construct a security requirements engineering tools selection framework. 
1.3. Research Problem 
One aspect of the security requirement is they address the needs of software in terms of security, 
and try to provide as much solutions as possible to cater security needs. The common way of 
investigating security is to define assets, roles, threats, vulnerabilities, risks, treatment and 
mitigations in a particular system. That in result will deliver unstructured and variant security 
requirements that can lead to misunderstanding and difficulties while implementation. And the 
quality of security requirements will not be of high standards. Moreover security requirements 
have the same changing nature of normal requirements which makes it complicated to jot down 
security requirements in concrete form.  
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As a consequence the solution for this problem is to follow a structured approach that in result 
will create high quality security requirements. Security engineering tools deliver a way to 
improve security requirement by providing several artifacts to address security related problems, 
and limit the user with security related artifacts. The function of these tools is to follow standards 
and procedures to construct security needs. These security needs finally will create standardized 
security requirements of high quality. There are several security engineering tools available, as 
the security needs are increasing day by day; these tools are becoming mature to capture 
requirements beyond common imagination of human mind. However these tools are still lacking 
the mass adoption because of acceptable maturity level. And which tool to choose from may take 
time and efforts. In order to achieve tool selection process we have to define research problem 
mentioned below.    
 Research Problem  
How to evaluate security requirements engineering tools?  
In this research work we will analyze the SE processes and tools that will provide us with the 
requirements for security requirements engineering tools selection process? Our focus will be 
limited to popular tools and processes because of limited amount of time available for this 
research work.  Before analyzing SE tools it is important to ask what should be the 
characteristics of SE tools. In order to simplify the problem, we divide it into two questions.  
 Research Question1  
What are the requirements when selecting security engineering tools that offer better 
means to support security requirement process and maintain high quality security 
requirements?  
In order to achieve verified results it is important that we evaluate the outcomes:   
 Research Question 2 
What are the means that fulfill security engineering tool requirements that provide 
improved security requirements artifact?  
That gives us our two questions that will be discussed and resolved in this thesis. These 
questions are derived from research problem and will be addressed resolving actual problem. 
However we only have divided this into two questions for simplicity.  
1.4. Structure of Work 
This thesis is structured into chapters, mentioned in Table  1-1 are the number, name and 
description of the chapter. The initial two chapters are for introducing the research work, and 
applications are in chapter 3 and 4. The findings can be visited in chapter 5, and results in 
chapter 6. Finally chapter 7 is for conclusion.  
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Table ‎1-1 Thesis Structure 
CH: ID Chapter Name Description 
1 Introduction  Introducing the Thesis, research question 
2 Security engineering and 
security requirements 
elicitation 
Security engineering definition, requirements elicitation 
techniques, and information security standards.  
3 Security development 
lifecycles 
Software security assurance processes.  
4 Security engineering methods 
& tools 
Security engineering methodologies, analysis of tools. 
5 Framework for security 
requirements engineering 
tools 
Security requirements, framework construction, and use of 
evaluation framework.  
6 Tool Assessment How this method was evaluated comparing one additional 
method and the results were given. 
7 Conclusion The conclusion and future work, related to this thesis work.  
 
In this thesis our approach will be straight forward, flowing with the tools and SSAP’s, which is 
quite a challenging task because of various differences in both. For the sake of simplicity we will 
eliminate some sub-processes in SSAP’s and take only the once that are relevant to our research. 
In this chapter we will introduce some of the common definitions that are used in this research 
work. This will give us a basic understanding of the terms used, and also will be a kick-starter for 
the upcoming chapters. And finally we will define the expected outcomes of this research. 
 Framework Definition   
In research work of Matulevičius about process support for requirements engineering, the 
framework definition is given as follows: The purpose of the frameworks is to provide a 
skeleton structure for the RE- tool evaluation and comparison (Matulevičius, 2005). A 
framework also works as a template guiding on how to proceed with the current process. 
 Process Definition 
The process is defined as “A systematic series of actions directed to some end” 
(Dictionary.com, 2014). This describes the process as a series of (tasks, events and activities) 
that combined together gives a complete set of process that will lead to a single outcome. 
Term process is commonly used while defining the lifecycle of a software development, as 
software lifecycle is mainly composed of series of different correlated or individual 
processes. 
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 Lifecycle Definition  
Lifecycle is defined as “A series of stages through which something (as an individual, 
culture, or manufactured product) passes during its lifetime” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 
While the word itself is taken from the evaluation of lifecycle, but also this has more 
resemblance to software lifecycle. Because software engineering is not only about 
developing software, it also includes security constraint, support and maintenance which can 
last for many years. Moreover the word lifecycle is used in other wide range of fields like 
(enterprise, product development, software release and more). Lifecycle can also be consist 
of several sub-sections delivering artifacts, or sub-objects.  
 Artifact Definition  
Artifact is defined as “An object made by a human being, typically an item of cultural or 
historical interest” by (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). While artifact in this research is referred 
to the sub-elements like (activities, tasks or events) involved during the lifecycle of the 
software development.   
1.5. Contribution  
In this research work our main focus is to analyze security engineering process and tools that will 
be used to form a framework that will help in choosing between SRE tools, i.e. what is the best 
available, well suited and well developed SRE tool? In chapter 5 we will discuss about the tools 
and processes that will help us in producing SRE tool selection method based on available 
functionality, and that will be our basis to introduce a framework. This thesis will produce some 
features, characteristics and validated requirements for SRE tools.  
 Features 
There will be two main features in this research work: 1. Analysis of security engineering 
lifecycles. 2. Requirements elicitation from SRE tools. As mentioned the motive will be to 
collect these requirements as precise as possible to avoid variation between processes and 
SRE tools. The elicited requirements from processes will then be merged and tested against 
the SRE tools.   
 Characteristic 
We will develop a Framework that will help leverage the SRE tool selection processes. 
Moreover there are several frameworks addressing in different aspects of software 
engineering field. This framework will be different in sense that this will be addressed to 
security aspects of the software development.  
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 Requirements validated for SRE-tool  
Finally after achieving the goal “having a SRE tool selection framework” at place we can 
define validation method. Questions like how to validate tools using constructed framework 
will be addressed in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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Security Engineering and Security Requirements 
Elicitation 
Security engineering is a field of software engineering, which includes safety, security, 
vulnerabilities and their treatment mechanisms. In a whole it is a big field to deal with, because 
more and more security vulnerabilities are on their way since the invention of internet and cloud 
based software. Modeling security requirements mainly tends our focus towards Use-cases. As 
mentioned by (Sindre, et al., 2005) “Use cases have become popular for determining, 
communicating, specifying, and documenting requirements”. In this research they also mention 
that most of the stakeholders are comfortable with descriptions of operational action sequences 
than declarative specifications. 
There are also problems with use-case-based approaches to requirements engineering, says 
(Sindre, et al., 2005), such as over simplified assumptions about the problem domain and 
premature design decisions. But with slight modification use-cases can provide functionality of 
security requirements. As though there are several methods and approaches to elicit security 
requirements. Our task will be to demonstrate, what these methods are and how these help 
engineers elicit the security requirements in this chapter.    
Talking about the security requirements elicitation, we will introduce security engineering along 
with security engineering analysis framework depicted in Figure  2-1, then we will discuss about 
requirements elicitation techniques as our main goal in this chapter will be to cover as much 
about the elicitation techniques most preferably adapted and used in the software industry. Most 
of the requirements in this research will be elicited by analyzing the SSAP’s and SRE tools. 
Where main method of gathering requirements consists of brainstorming and reading the SSAP’s 
and tools itself. Moreover when it comes to requirements gathering there are 10 most common 
approaches defined in (Mochal, 2008). Also in this chapter we have introduced security 
engineering approaches, mentioned in Table  2-1, and information security standards, which 
resolves different problem than our focus approach depicted in Figure  2-2.  
2 
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2.1. Security  
One of the well-known authors of the book security engineering Ross Anderson describes the 
security as: “Security engineering is about building systems to remain dependable in the face of 
malice, error, or mischance” (Anderson, 2001). 
The software should be dependable in the face of Malice: Desire to inflict injury, harm, or 
suffering on another, either because of a hostile impulse or out of deep-seated meanness 
(Dictionary.com, 2014). The software should be dependable in the face of Error: a deviation 
from accuracy or correctness; a mistake, as in action or speech (Dictionary.com, 2014). The 
software should be dependable in the face of Mischance: a mishap or misfortune 
(Dictionary.com, 2014). 
Security engineering is a discipline which requires expertise from many different domains i.e. 
software cryptography and hardware temper-resistance. Moreover it involves the tools, 
processes, and methods (Anderson, 2001). According to Anderson a good security requires four 
things to come together: Policy, Incentives, Mechanism and Assurance. See the framework 
diagram depicted in Figure  2-1. 
 
Security engineering analysis framework is an abstract declaration of security engineering 
process, which provides all necessary attributes associated with the security engineering. Almost 
all companies have policy defined where security constraints are declared. Either physical 
tangible assets or non-tangible information related objects, in this framework both can fit very 
well. However our priority is information security that comes with the software security. For 
example: In almost all companies security policy is defined in some sense. And applying a 
security mechanism will provide with an incentive i.e. secure software. And finally assurance 
will give satisfaction of achievement of the objective security policy.  
Some more definitions of security are: 
Policy Incentives 
Mechanism Assurance 
Figure ‎2-1 Security Engineering Analysis Framework > Adapted from (Anderson, 2001) 
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 Software security is the idea of engineering software so that it continues to function 
correctly under malicious attack (McGraw, 2003). 
 Security engineering is the field of engineering dealing with the security and integrity of 
real-world systems (Science Daily, 2014). 
2.2. Requirements and Security Requirements 
Most of the authors agree on the requirement definition that it is the specification of stakeholders 
needs. IEEE defines requirement as (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 1990). 
1. A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective. 
2. A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or system component 
to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed document. 
3. A document representation of a condition or capability as in definition 1 or 2. 
Our motive is to make a clear distinction between requirements and security requirements. As 
both comes under one heading, and has the same objective of “demonstrating specifications”. 
They are lot more different in sense that security requirements in it can have large amount 
documentations stating the software specifications on security perspective. After defining few 
more requirements definition from the different authors we will discuss about security 
requirements.  
“Requirements definition includes, but is not limited to, the problem analysis that yields a 
functional specification. It is much more than that. Requirements definition must encompass 
everything necessary to lay the ground work for subsequent stages in system development” (T. 
Ross, et al., 1977). 
One of the definitions of software requirement specification is: a software requirement 
specification is a comprehensive description of the intended purpose and environment for 
software under development (TechTarget, 2014). 
In software requirements, most commonly three types of requirements are categorized in general 
(Sommerville, 2004). 
 Functional Requirements: 
“Statements of services the system should provide how the system should react to 
particular inputs and how the system should behave in particular situations.” 
(Sommerville, 2004). 
 Non-Functional Requirements: 
“Constraints on the services or functions offered by the system such as timing constraints, 
constrains on the developments process, standards, etc.” (Sommerville, 2004). 
 Domain Requirements: 
“Requirements that come from the application domain of the system and that reflect 
characteristics of that domain.” (Sommerville, 2004). 
 Chapter 2: Security Engineering and Security Requirements Elicitation 
 
10  
 
Now let’s define security requirements, “security requirements have traditionally been 
considered to be” non-functional requirements” or “quality” requirements. Like other quality 
requirements (e.g., performance, usability, cost to run), they do not have simple yes/no 
satisfaction criteria. Instead, one must somehow determine whether a quality requirement has 
been satisfied”. 
Like a requirements expert who try to elicit the requirements via questioning from the customer 
and user. A security requirements expert may gather security requirements via questioning the 
attackers and malicious users’ perspective. Getting from the fact that security requirements don’t 
always have yes/no answer to the problem, these however in a whole are extended to overall 
lifecycle of the software development, e.g. from requirements gathering to response.  
2.3. Security Engineering Approaches 
Nicolas Mayer has defined four types of approaches that are most common among the security 
engineering institutes, Security Oriented, Risk-based, Requirement Engineering, and Model-
based approach (Mayer, 2009). Different security engineering methodologies however follow 
different approach in sense that their focus varies. While all of these methodologies follow 
Requirements engineering approach and varies in other aspects. See Table  2-1 that shows the 
methodology and approach adapted by the security engineering methods.  
Table ‎2-1 Summary of software and security engineering state of the art > Adapted from 
(Mayer, 2009) 
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 a
n
d
 S
ec
u
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ty
 E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 
References Security 
Oriented 
Risk-based 
approach 
RE 
approach 
Model-based 
approach 
Firesmith  ++ + ++ - 
Haley et al. and Moffet and 
Nuseibeh 
++ + ++ - 
DITSCAP automation 
framework 
++ ++ ++ - 
SQUARE ++ ++ ++ - 
KAOS extended to security ++ - ++ ++ 
Misuse cases ++ - ++ ++ 
Abuse cases ++ - ++ ++ 
Mal-activity diagrams ++ - ++ ++ 
Abuse frames ++ - ++ ++ 
Secure Tropos ++ - ++ ++ 
Tropos Goal-Risk framework - ++ ++ ++ 
Legend: 
++: Completely covered and at the core of the document 
+: Partially covered or not playing a central role 
-: Not covered 
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2.4. Information Security Standards 
In thesis work of Nicolas Mayer (Mayer, 2009) the overview of “ISO/IEC 2700X series of 
standards” is provided. Figure  2-2 is showing standard ISO/IEC 2700X series at the core of the 
diagram, from where other standards are derived. These standards are focused on risk 
management (RM). These are also known as ISMS information security management system 
standards. “The ISO standards providing requirements and guidance about best management 
practices are part of the most well-known standards. The most popular management system 
series of standards are the ISO 900X series about quality management systems” (Mayer, 2009). 
In his work Mayer mentions several standards, i.e. international organization of 
standardization/international electro-technical commission (ISO/IEC), technical specification 
(ISO/TS) and international workshop agreement (IWA) standards. From these our main focus is 
ISO/IEC 2700X series which as mentioned is dealing with information security.  
 
“An ISMS is a systematic approach to managing sensitive company information so that it 
remains secure. It includes people, processes and IT systems by applying a risk management 
 
ISO/IEC 2700X 
series 
Other pending 
standards... ISO/IEC 27007 
Auditor guidelines 
ISO/IEC 27006 
Accreditation bodies 
ISO/IEC 27004 
Measurements 
ISO/IEC 27003 
Implementation 
guidance 
ISO/IEC 27002 
Code of Practice 
ISO/IEC 27006 
ISMS Requirements 
ISO/IEC 27005 
Risk Management 
ISO/IEC 27000 
Overview and 
vocabulary 
Legend 
Published 
Unpublished 
Figure ‎2-2 The ISO/IEC 2700X series of standards > Adapted from (Mayer, 2009) 
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process” (ISO, 2014). Security standards however are there for assuring the information security, 
unlike security engineering processes which are addressed towards producing secure software. 
2.5. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter we have introduced security engineering definition, which is an abstract to our 
topic, requirements and security requirements definition, to give reader understanding of security 
requirements elicitation approaches. Finally we have introduced with information security 
management standards (ISMS) to illustrate that ISMS resolves different problem adopting 
different approach than software security assurance processes (discussed in later chapters).  
Coming up next we will introduce SSAP’s and some additional definitions that will help us in 
understanding the chapter context. Our task will be to elicit requirements from SSAP’s i.e. what 
a particular SSAP require in order fulfill the criteria of being able to develop secure software. 
This will help us in testing the security engineering tools.  
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Security Development Lifecycles 
The need for stable and non-redundant Security development lifecycle is crucial, because 
“almost every software controlled system faces threats from potential adversaries”, as mentioned 
in (T. Devanbu, et al., 2000). Almost all of the software security assurance processes agree that 
software security is inbuilt feature in the software through whole lifecycle of the software 
development process. That’s why it is essential to mention that security can also be more 
difficult to implement in the later software development process or in already developed 
software. 
As a matter of fact, requirements are the major part of any software system, and chances are 
these requirements will evolve in later development process. To register these requirements in 
early stage of lifecycle model, engineers try to surface with the solutions. In most of the software 
development processes requirements part is initiated in the beginning of the lifecycle, however 
each development phase has its own levels and standards to follow. In order to enable security 
into the software in stages security engineers at Microsoft have developed optimization model 
shown in Figure  3-2 where phases can be seen divided into types known as (Basic, Standardized, 
Advanced and Dynamic). The emphasis of this chapter will be to analyze the available well 
developed security engineering processes that focus on developing secure software. It will lead 
our focus to primary outcome from this chapter “derived requirements” by analyzing the core 
requirements and implementation from security development lifecycles. 
Notice the fact that security requirements are non-functional requirements. It is worthy to 
mention that it increases development costs, and more, its time consuming as well. Placing 
security concern in early stages of software development lifecycle will reduce development costs 
(Microsoft., 2014). 
To start with we introduce the general lifecycle model depicted in Figure  3-1 which will be the 
basis for software security assurance processes (SSAP), than we will introduce optimization 
model which is a good example on showing how security can be divided into levels depicted in 
Figure  3-2. Next we will go through all available or commonly used SSAP’s, and try to elicit 
3 
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requirements as precise as possible. And finally we will try to merge these elicited requirements 
and form a single table mentioned in Table  5-1. These elicited requirements will be used to 
analyze the SRE tools that are discussed in later chapter. Moreover there will be an example on 
how software security is enabled into the software under heading 3.3.   
3.1. Stages of Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) 
SDLC is commonly referred to software development lifecycle that consist of four lifecycle 
stages suggested in General Lifecycle Model (Ragunath, et al., 2010). In Figure  3-1 the major 
steps involved in lifecycle are depicted along with one addition of release process. This 
framework is often taken as framework for introducing any software development lifecycle 
process (including SSAP Software security assurance processes) discussed later in this chapter. 
 Introducing additional process of release is vital here because all SSAP’s include response plan 
which is needed during response from the field. In SSAP’s as mentioned all sub-processes have 
separate security requirements, in case of release there will be a response plan e.g. how to 
address critical threat after release.  
 
3.2. Optimization Model  
Figure  3-2 is showing the levels of SDLC that has been sub grouped under (Basic, Standardized, 
Advanced and dynamic) it focuses on development process improvement, contrast to other 
development models.  It also suggests that process improvement is one of the key features of 
security development lifecycle, discussed under next heading (Microsoft.., 2010). 
3.3. Example on Security Engineering Process  
One of the examples mentioned can be seen at (Microsoft., 2014), where three years old services 
written in C++ with 11,000 LOC were using unauthenticated access in database-driven web 
product. After gaining knowledge about threat modeling (See Table  4-1 Requirements from 
SDL), two team members uncover vulnerability in sensitive data. “One developer elects to 
address the possible SQL injection vulnerabilities identified by the threat modeling”. He uses 
stored procedure in places where they were not used, modifies the access rights and also removes 
the interactive user’s permissions for deleting database objects.  
 
 
Design 
 
Implementation 
 
Testing 
Figure ‎3-1 General Life Cycle Model > Adapted from (Ragunath, et al., 2010) 
 
Relese 
 
Requirements 
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Example above gives the understanding that team was working on legacy system and according 
to (Microsoft.., 2010) “Integration of secure development concepts into an existing development 
process can be intimidating and costly if done improperly”. So the most important part for them 
was to uncover some of the critical vulnerabilities. To do so they started reading “Threat 
modeling” in book “The Security Development Lifecycle”, and try to come up with the most 
appropriate solution, in this case fixing the access rights and addressing the issues with SQL 
injection.  
3.4. Security Engineering Assurance Processes 
Software Security Assurance Processes (SSAP) are for supporting secure software development, 
further more they facilitate software security at the core of the process evaluation which in turn 
construct a software skeleton for developers. There are three security engineering methods 
discussed in this thesis: 
 SDL (Howard, et al., 2006) 
 7 Touch points (Addison-Wesley Software Security Series, 2006) 
 OWASP (OWASP, 2014).  
3.4.1. Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) 
Microsoft security development lifecycle (SDL) is a security assurance process that is focused on 
secure software development (Howard, et al., 2006). It is based on traditional SDLC, in addition 
to this, SDL consist of further added processes for security. Training and (Response & Release) 
are now the important parts of the secure software development. All processes in this lifecycle 
have been broken down under sub-processes (knows as artifacts in our research).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advanced 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized 
Training, Policy, and organizational Capabilities 
Requirements and Design 
Implementation 
Verification 
Release and Response 
Figure ‎3-2 SDL Optimization Model with Capability and Maturity Levels > 
Adapted from (Microsoft, 2010) 
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Figure ‎3-3 Security Development Lifecycle > Adapted from (Microsoft.., 2010) 
Figure  3-3 shows the processes along with artifacts, and from these artifacts we will try to extract 
requirements that will be used as a base for testing the SRE tools. Table  3-1 is constructed in a 
way that it gives phase-by-phase artifact heading following a requirement ID. Requirements 
column is derived by analyzing the artifact description, i.e. what requirements can be gathered in 
a particular artifact, and what techniques can be used. The requirements in Table  3-1 are 
numbered in a way that requirement SRS004 mentioned has artifact (Perform security and 
privacy risk assessment).  
Table ‎3-1 Requirements from SDL 
SDL REQ 
ID 
Artifact  Requirements 
PH1: Training 
SRS001 Core Training  Tool should provide basic training material that will help 
understand the implementation of secure software. 
PH2: Requirements 
SRS002 Establish security and 
privacy requirements  
Tool should provide the means of establishing security and 
privacy requirements, defining minimum criteria for security 
and privacy for an application, and provide work item tracking 
system.  
SRS003 Create quality gates/bug 
bars 
Tool should provide bug severity threshold, with ratings e.g. 
critical, important.  
SRS004 Perform security and 
privacy risk assessment  
Tool should be able to provide means of examining software 
design based on cost and regulatory requirements.   
PH3: Design 
SRS005 Establish design 
requirements   
Tool should provide means of validating design specification 
against functional specification, i.e. accurate and complete 
design specification, and minimal cryptographic design 
requirements. 
SRS007 Perform attack surface 
analysis 
Tool should provide through analysis of overall attack surface, 
i.e. defining system privileges and employing layered 
defenses.  
Training 
 
Requirements 
 
      Design 
 
Implimentation Verification 
 
Release 
 
Response 
 Establish Security 
Requiremetns. 
Create Quality  
Gates/Bug Bars. 
Security & Privacy 
Risk Assessment. 
 
Establish Design 
Requiremets. 
Analyze Attack 
Surface. 
Threat Modeling 
 
Use Approved  
Tools. 
Depricate Unsafe      
Functions. 
Static Analysis. 
 
 
Core Security  
Training 
 
Dyamic Aalysis. 
Fuzz Testing. 
Attack Surface 
Review. 
 
Incident Response 
Plan. 
Final Security  
Review. 
Release Archive. 
 
Execute 
Incident  
ResponsePlan 
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SRS008 Use threat modeling  Tool should be able to provide structured approach to threat 
scenarios, i.e. identification of security vulnerabilities, and 
determining risks from these threats, and establishing 
appropriate mitigation.  
PH4: Implementation 
SRS009 Use approved tools  Tool should provide list of approved tools and associated 
security checks (such as compiler options and warning).  
SRS010 Deprecate unsafe 
functions  
Tool should be able to provide project functions API’s 
 
SRS011 Perform static analysis Tool should provide security code review analysis policy.  
PH5: Verification 
SRS012 Perform dynamic 
analysis 
Tool should be able to provide security code verification 
functionality, i.e. run-time 
SRS013 Perform fuzz testing Tool should be able to provide testing policy, i.e. deliberate 
program failure by introducing malformed random data. 
SRS014 Conduct attack surface 
review 
Tool should provide means of attack surface review. 
PH6: Release 
SRS015 Create incident response 
plan 
Tool should provide means of response plan to address new 
threats. 
SRS016 Conduct final security 
review  
Tool should provide means of reviewing all security activities 
performed during lifecycle. 
SRS017 Certify release and 
archive 
Tool should provide means of ensuring privacy and security 
requirements were meat, and archiving of data essential to post 
release servicing tasks.  
PH7: Response 
SRS018 Execute incident 
response plan 
Tool should be able to provide implementation of incident 
response plan,  
3.4.2. Software Security (7 Touch points) 
7 Touch points STP is the security development process that focuses on set of best practices. 
(Addison-Wesley Software Security Series, 2006) Seven touch points provide seven features 
improvements in regards to the software security. This security assurance process is also follows 
the traditional approach of general development model depicted in Figure  3-1 along with 
additional processes, Test plans and feedback from the field.  
In Figure  3-4 seven processes are depicted, and unlike SDL they have artifacts mentioned above 
these processes. In this research work we will take these artifacts and try to gather the 
requirements as we did for SDL previously. These requirements can be seen in Table  3-2 where 
in requirements column requirements are defined as precise as possible. 
 Chapter 3: Security Development Lifecycles  
 
18  
 
 
Table ‎3-2 Requirements from 7 Touch Points 
STP REQ 
ID 
Artifact Requirement 
SRT001 Code review tools Tool should provide the ability of static and dynamic code 
review 
SRT002 Risk analysis Tool should provide means of analyzing the associated risks 
with the development software 
SRT003 Penetration testing   Tool should provide means of conducting penetration testing 
(Vulnerability scanning) 
SRT004 Risk based security tests Tool should provide means of producing test runs at 
individual unit level.  
SRT005 Abuse cases Tool should provide functionality of drawing abuse cases 
(similar to misuse cases) 
SRT006 Security requirements   Tool should provide list of all security activities performed 
during lifecycle. 
SRT007 Security operations Tool should provide means of reviewing all security 
operations associated with product and company 
3.4.3. OWASP CLASP 
One last in SSAP’s list is OWASP, which is an abbreviation for Open Web Application Security 
Project. It is an open source project developed by software security community (Open software 
security community, 2014). It also provides several artifacts under which general life cycle 
model framework shown in Figure  3-1 considered the bases in development of OWASP. There is 
no particular diagram available to depict SSAP itself; however the CLASP views can be seen in 
Figure  3-5. That separates the CLASP views in different appropriate perspectives for developing 
Risk-Based 
Security Tests 
Code Review 
(Tools) 
Abuse 
Cases 
Security 
Requirements 
 
Requirements 
And Use Cases 
 
Architecture 
And Design 
 
Test Plans 
 
Code 
 
Tests and 
Test Results 
 
Feedback From 
The Field 
Penetration 
Testing 
Risk 
Analysis 
Security 
Operations 
Risk 
Analysis 
External 
Review 
Figure ‎3-4 Software Security 7 Touch Points > Adapted from (Addison-Wesley 
Software Security Series, 2006) 
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secure software. Table  3-3 is showing the elicited requirements from OWASP SSAP, where the 
columns are divided as, requirements ID, next artifacts definition, and finally requirements.  
As OWASP provides open source platform so we can analyze extensive features of an SSAP. In 
this section we have introduced the requirements shown in Table  3-3 OWASP process in Figure 
 3-5 and OWASP top 10 security risks in Table  3-4.  
Table ‎3-3 Requirements from OWASP 
OCL REQ 
ID 
Artifact Requirement 
SRC001 Institute Awareness 
Program 
Tool should provide basic training material and instructions 
that will help understand the implementation of secure 
software. 
SRC002 Perform Application 
Assessments 
Tool should provide means of analyzing security 
requirements and design, security test and Source level 
security review  
SRC003 Capture Security 
Requirements 
Tool should provide building misuse cases, security policy, 
attack surface and trust boundaries illustration 
SRC004 Implement Secure 
Development Practices  
Tool should provide guide on how to annotate classes with 
security properties, secure design, resources, contracts and 
interfaces.  
SRC005 Build Vulnerability 
Remediation Procedures 
Tool should provide guide on how to address reported 
security issues and security issue disclosure process. 
SRC006 Define and Monitor 
Metrics 
Tool should provide means of creating metrics, in order to 
evaluate results, 
SRC007 Publish Operational 
Security Guidelines 
Build operational security guide, specify database security 
configuration.  
 
 The Comprehensive, Lightweight, Application Security Process (CLASP) 
“The CLASP provides a well-organized and structured approach for moving security 
concerns into early stages of the software development lifecycle, whenever possible” 
(OWASP, 2014). There are five high level perspectives called CLASP views, these views 
broken down into activities which contain process components. To understand CLASP 
process Figure  3-5 illustrates the inner working of this process, as from View > Activity 
> Process component.  
CLAPS views are categorized in a way that engineers can see through different 
perspective from each view. First there is a concept view to get through the basics of the 
process. There is role-based view to help understanding the authentication management. 
Activity-assessment view to understand the costs, applicability, and risk of inaction. 
Activity-implementation view to analyze the security related activities. And finally there 
is a vulnerability view to state risks, problems, consequences etc. 
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Figure ‎3-5 CLASP Views and their interactions > Adapted from 
 Anti-Requirements in OWASP perspective 
An anti-requirement is a requirement of a malicious user that subverts an existing 
requirement (Crook, et al., 2002). An anti-requirement is mainly created by a malicious 
user; however it can be created by security requirement engineer by the use of 
misuse/abuse cases or other modes of requirements elicitation tools. In Table  3-4 
OWASP top 10 security risks are mentioned, these can be taken as the most updated 
security risks because OWASP community prints “OWASP top 10” article on yearly 
basis.  
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Table ‎3-4 OWASP Top 10 > Adapted from (OWASP, 2013) 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 R
is
k
s 
Security Risk Description 
Injection Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when 
untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The 
attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended 
commands or accessing data without proper authorization. 
Broken Authentication 
and Session 
Management  
Application functions related to authentication and session management 
are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to compromise 
passwords, keys, or session tokens, or to exploit other implementation 
flaws to assume other users’ identities. 
Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) 
XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and sends it 
to a web browser without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows 
attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which can hijack user 
sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites. 
Insecure Direct object 
references 
A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to 
an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, or database 
key. Without an access control check or other protection, attackers can 
manipulate these references to access unauthorized data. 
Security 
Misconfiguration  
Good security requires having a secure configuration defined and deployed 
for the application, frameworks, application server, web server, database 
server, and platform. Secure settings should be defined, implemented, and 
maintained, as defaults are often insecure. Additionally, software should be 
kept up to date. 
Sensitive Data 
Exposure 
Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive data, such as 
credit cards, tax IDs, and authentication credentials. Attackers may steal or 
modify such weakly protected data to conduct credit card fraud, identity 
theft, or other crimes. Sensitive data deserves extra protection such as 
encryption at rest or in transit, as well as special precautions when 
exchanged with the browser. 
Missing Function 
level Access Control 
Most web applications verify function level access rights before making 
that functionality visible in the UI. However, applications need to perform 
the same access control checks on the server when each function is 
accessed. If requests are not verified, attackers will be able to forge 
requests in order to access functionality without proper authorization. 
Cross-Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF)  
A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim’s browser to send a forged HTTP 
request, including the victim’s session cookie and any other automatically 
included authentication information, to a vulnerable web application. This 
allows the attacker to force the victim’s browser to generate requests the 
vulnerable application thinks are legitimate requests from the victim. 
Using Components 
with known 
vulnerabilities 
Components, such as libraries, frameworks, and other software modules, 
almost always run with full privileges. If a vulnerable component is 
exploited, such an attack can facilitate serious data loss or server takeover. 
Applications using components with known vulnerabilities may undermine 
application defenses and enable a range of possible attacks and impacts. 
Un-validated 
Redirects and 
forwards 
Web applications frequently redirect and forward users to other pages and 
websites, and use untrusted data to determine the destination pages. 
Without proper validation, attackers can redirect victims to phishing or 
malware sites, or use forwards to access unauthorized pages. 
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3.5. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter we have introduced SSAP’s and elicit requirements that will be testing against 
tools in the next chapter. We have discussed aspects of software development lifecycle, and how 
secure software development processes are related to general lifecycle model. We fulfilled the 
task of eliciting requirements from SSAP’s which in return gave us seven requirements 
mentioned in Table  5-1 to test on SRE tools.  
Coming up next security engineering tools description and their evaluation, we will introduce the 
methodologies which have been adapted by SRE tools. After describing the methodologies we 
will start testing the tools against requirements depicted in Table  5-1. 
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Security Engineering Methods and Tools 
Security engineering tools are well known for describing threats, vulnerabilities, risks and 
mitigations most of which is done by defining the model via use-case, misuse-case, and abuse-
case diagrams. With time and seeing the desperate need towards security, requirements gathering 
has been evolved to elicit security requirements using similar approach but with variant artifact. 
These artifacts are defined and used in software security engineering tools.  In this chapter we 
will introduce CORAS methodology (CORAS, 2014) which is depicted in Figure  4-1, SQUARE 
methodology (Mead, et al., 2005) can be visited in Table  4-1, and TROPOS methodology 
(Mouratidis, et al., 2008) in Table  4-2. Next we will introduce the security engineering tools that 
have adapted these methodologies, and test our proposed requirements from previous chapter 
against tools.  
Apart from use-case, misuse-case and abuse-cases there are several other techniques available in 
eliciting software security requirements, some of which are:  
1. Security Risk oriented BPMN (Altuhhova, et al., 2013) 
2. Secure UML (Basin, et al., 2009) 
3. UML SEC (Jürjens, 2001)  
4. Misuse Cases (Sindre, et al., 2005) 
5. Mal-Activity Diagram (Sindre, 2006) 
However each tool that we are going to test in this chapter adapts different approach in eliciting 
security requirements, and their approach is mostly based on unified modeling languages.   
4.1. Security Engineering Methods 
In security engineering methods we have chosen CORAS, SQUARE, and TROPOS because 
these methods have been adapted by well-developed software security requirements engineering 
tools, named CORAS, SQUARE, and SecTro2 tools. We will introduce the methodologies first 
and then we will analyze the tools one by one. 
4 
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4.1.1. CORAS 
CORAS is a method for conducting security risk analysis, it provides a customized language for 
threat and risk modeling and comes with detailed guidelines explaining how the language should 
be used to capture and model relevant information during the various stages of the security 
analysis. (CORAS, 2014). CORAS also includes with the tool that follows CORAS method 
depicted in Figure  4-1. 
There are eight steps involved in CORAS method that are considered as steps to conduct security 
risk analysis. Figure  4-1 represents basis for this methodology that includes asset, threat, risk, 
and treatment diagrams. (CORAS, 2014). While analyzing the tool we will be able to see the 
CORAS method in action under heading security engineering tools analysis.  
 
Figure ‎4-1 CORAS > Adapted from (CORAS, 2014) 
 
4.1.2. SQUARE 
The SQUARE is the short form for Security Quality Requirements Engineering. It is the process 
that provides means for eliciting, categorizing, and prioritizing security requirements for 
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information technology systems and applications (Mead, et al., 2005). Announced four years ago 
SQUARE tool is also available to download which we will be analyzed in this chapter.  
In SQUARE method there are nine discrete steps that surrounds over all method. Table  4-1 is 
divided into five columns which gives an overview of the inner workings of the SQUARE 
method. Each step identifies the inputs, major participants, suggested techniques and output, 
where output from each step severs as an input for the next step.  
Table ‎4-1 Steps in SQUARE Process > Adapted from (Mead, et al., 2005) 
 Step 
# 
Step Input Techniques Participants Output 
S
Q
U
A
R
E
 S
T
E
P
S
 
1 Agree on 
definitions 
Candidate 
definitions from 
IEEE and other 
standards 
Structured 
interviews, 
focus group 
Stakeholders, 
requirements 
team 
Agreed-to 
definitions  
2 Identify 
security goals 
Definitions, 
candidate goals, 
business drivers, 
policies and 
procedures, 
examples 
Facilitated work 
session, surveys 
interviews 
Stakeholders, 
requirements 
engineer 
Goals 
3 Develop 
artifacts to 
support 
security 
requirements 
definition 
Potential 
artifacts (e.g., 
scenarios, 
misuse cases, 
templates, 
forms) 
Work session Requirements 
engineer 
 Needed 
artifacts: 
scenarios, 
misuse 
cases, 
models, 
templates, 
forms 
4 Perform risk 
assessment 
Misuse cases, 
scenarios, 
security goals 
Risk assessment 
method, analysis 
of anticipated 
risk against 
organizational 
risk tolerance, 
including threat 
analysis 
Requirements 
engineer, risk 
expert, 
stakeholders 
Risk 
assessment 
results 
5 Select 
elicitation 
techniques 
Goals, 
definitions, 
candidate 
techniques, 
expertise of 
stakeholders, 
organizational 
style, culture, 
level of security 
needed, cost 
benefit analysis, 
Work session Requirements 
engineer 
Selected 
elicitation 
techniques 
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etc. 
6 Elicit security 
requirements  
Artifacts, risk 
assessment 
results, selected 
techniques 
Joint application 
development 
(JAD), 
interviews, 
surveys, model-
based analysis, 
checklists, lists 
of reusable 
requirements 
types, document 
reviews 
Stakeholders 
facilitated 
requirements 
engineer 
Initial cut at 
security 
requirement 
7 Categorize 
requirements 
as to level 
(system, 
software, etc.) 
and whether 
they are 
requirements 
or other kinds 
of constraints 
Initial 
requirements, 
architecture 
Work session 
using a standard 
set of categories 
Requirements 
engineer, other 
specialists as 
needed 
Categorized 
requirement
s 
8 Prioritize 
requirements 
Categorized 
requirements 
and risk 
assessment 
results 
Prioritization 
methods such as 
Triage, Win-
Win 
Stakeholders 
facilitated by 
requirements 
engineer 
Prioritized 
requirement
s 
9 Requirements 
inspection 
Prioritized 
requirements, 
candidate formal 
inspection 
technique 
Inspection 
method such as 
Fagan, peer 
reviews 
Inspection 
team 
Initial 
selected 
requirement
s, 
documentati
on of 
decision 
making 
process and 
rationale 
4.1.3. Secure TROPOS  
In TROPOS methodology there are five main development phases: Early requirements, late 
requirements, architectural design, detailed design and implementation (Bresciani, et al., 2004). 
The major difference mentioned in this research paper is the notion of early requirements, as 
most of the developers can work well with later four phases. In Table  4-2 available phases of 
Tropos can be seen.  
TROPOS also comes with certain stages that are required in the secure software development 
lifecycle. There are 6 stages in TROPS methodology (Mouratidis, et al., 2008) which states 
similar stages as of secure software development lifecycle. The main artifacts discussed in 
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TROPOS are Actor, Goal, Plan, Resource, Dependency, Capability and Belief, which are used to 
model the requirements in security domain. 
Table ‎4-2 TROPOS Phases > Adapted from (Mouratidis, et al., 2008) 
 Stage ID TROPS Stage 
T
R
O
P
O
S
 
P
H
A
S
E
S
 
1 Context and Asset Identification 
2 Security objective determination 
3 Risk analysis and assessment 
4 Risk treatment  
5 Security requirement definition 
6 Control selection and implementation 
4.2. Security Engineering Tools 
Security engineering tools are for aiding the requirements gathering process for secure software 
development at smooth pace. These tools are mostly based on unified modeling language (UML) 
however they do follow various approaches to address the same problem of eliciting security 
requirements. As we have already chosen methodologies CORAS, SQUARE, and TROPOS we 
will analyze the tools that have adapt these three methodologies.  
1. CORAS (CORAS methodology) (CORAS, 2014) 
2. SQUARE (SQUARE methodology) (Mead, et al., 2005) 
3. SecTro2 (TROPOS methodology) (Mouratidis, et al., 2008)  
4.2.1. Capabilities of CORAS Tool 
CORAS is UML based security requirements gathering tool, which emphasis on generating risk 
and threat scenarios with the help of associated diagrams. It provides from basic diagram 
artifacts to advance artifacts. CORAS tool includes various artifacts to help understand the 
security constraint and requirements. In order to well organize the elicited security requirements 
CORAS tool separate these artifacts into categories i.e. connections, basic CORAS, high level 
CORAS, dependent CORAS, and legal CORAS. In appendix-A these artifacts can be seen.  
To help understand the available features of the tools we introduce one scenario based on 
Telemedicine Company (Clinical health care at distance). That is available in CORAS tutorial 
slides from (Lund, et al., 2011), which initiates a scenario where a hacker tries to break-into the 
system and steals the health records. In Figure  4-2 a deliberate threat diagram has been depicted 
where hacker/eavesdropper is on the most left and health records (assets) are on the most right. 
The lock (insufficient security) is vulnerability, (system break-in) is threat scenario, and finally 
(health records theft) is unwanted incident. 
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Figure ‎4-2 Deliberate Threat > Adapted from (Lund, et al., 2011) 
Figure  4-2 is depicting a scenario of deliberate threat, in the face of a hacker/eavesdropper who 
tries to break-in to the system taking advantage of insufficient security and eventually staling 
health records. 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Accidental Threat > Adapted from (Lund, et al., 2011) 
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In Figure  4-3 the same threat diagram is depicting an accidental threat, with additional assets, 
vulnerabilities, unwanted incident, and threat scenario. In this case the diagram shows most of 
the possibilities of accidental threats, unlike previous diagram of deliberate threat.  
 
Figure ‎4-4 Telemedicine Assets > Adapted from (Lund, et al., 2011) 
Figure  4-4 shows the asset diagram for telemedicine scenario, where all the assets are liable to 
compliance of telemedicine company. In case of any unwanted incident shown in Figure  4-4 
telemedicine will equally contribute in compromise of compliance. 
Figure  4-5 defines the risks associated with the telemedicine system, and their severity inside the 
brackets. Risk diagram’s incident likelihood calculation formulas are also the key for calculating 
the severity mentioned in (Refsdal, 2014). 
And finally in Figure  4-6 the treatment diagram is depicting most of the treatment scenarios in 
the box with the green spanner. All vulnerabilities cannot be addressed so most of them are 
treated accordingly.   
As we have already depicted most of the available feature diagrams in CORAS now we can test 
the tool against requirements collected in previous chapter. Table  4-3 shows the requirement ID, 
requirement name, requirement fulfillment description, and means to fulfill requirement in 
CORAS tool. The requirements fulfillment from CORAS tool can also be seen in Figure  4-7. 
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Figure ‎4-5 Telemedicine Risks > Adapted from (Lund, et al., 2011) 
 
Figure ‎4-6 Telemedicine Treatment > Adapted from (Lund, et al., 2011) 
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Table ‎4-3 Requirements from CORAS tool 
REQ 
ID 
Requirement 
Name 
Requirement fulfillment description Means to fulfill requirement 
(Status) 
SR001 Making 
awareness 
CORAS tool includes the methodology and 
tutorials which in an instance give a glimpse 
that the method/tool is trying to achieve the 
first requirements. Also CORAS website 
http://coras.sourceforge.net/ provides 
seminars sometimes which will be helpful for 
the software development team. In this case 
CORAS fulfills this requirement 
1. Resources available at 
http://coras.sourceforge.n
et/ 
2. Methodology  
3. Tutorial at: 
http://coras.sourceforge.n
et/newsarchive.html 
4. Publications at: 
http://coras.sourceforge.n
et/online_documentation.
html 
SR002 Understandin
g context and 
assets 
In correspondence to Figure  4-4 CORAS 
provides a way to demonstrate the assets 
along with the compliance in case of 
unwanted incident, so clearly CORAS also 
fulfills this requirement also 
1. Asset diagram 
 
SR003 Security 
requirements 
In Figure  4-6 CORAS tries to fulfill the 
security requirements in the face of 
mitigations. The diagram itself shows the 
threats, vulnerabilities and unwanted incidents 
which are been addressed with the use of 
treatment diagram 
1. Treatment diagram 
SR004 Risk analysis In Figure  4-5 CORAS Risk diagram shows 
the risks in the face of unwanted incidents, so 
it proves that CORAS also fulfill this 
requirement 
1. Risk diagram 
2. Threat diagram 
SR005 Secure design 
practices 
Tool does not address anything related to 
software architecture, and or implementation 
of secure design, which leads us to fail this 
requirement in CORAS tool 
-NA 
SR006 Justify design 
solution 
CORAS method and tool provides some 
manual techniques to calculate the severity 
and likelihood of the incident. But it does not 
provide anything in the tool itself that can 
automate this calculation process. As there is 
some technique to calculate we make this 
requirements as fulfilled 
1. Calculus for likelihood 
reasoning, available at 
http://coras.sourceforge.n
et/documents/tutorials/pa
rt1_CCS2011_CORAS.p
df 
 
SR007 Response CORAS does not provide any thing in 
correspondence to the response plan. 
However the tool has capability to 
demonstrate the response plan by using the 
available artifacts. For example Response 
diagram can be drawn using the artifacts used 
in Figure  4-6 treatment diagram. So we take 
this requirement as fulfilled 
1. Means to create response 
plan diagram 
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Figure ‎4-7 Requirements fulfillment from CORAS 
4.2.2. Capabilities of SQUARE Tool 
The SQUARE tool is developed in Google web tool kit, which allows users to create projects 
from the perspective of security, and privacy or both. After creating a project in SQUARE tool 
user can see three categorize or stages: Determine context, Gather security requirements, and 
Analyze requirements. Table  4-4 shows these categories along with internal steps which cover all 
the aspects of software security requirements that can also be seen in Figure  4-8.  
Table ‎4-4 Steps in SQUARE tool 
 Step ID: Category Step 
S
T
E
P
S
 I
N
 S
Q
U
A
R
E
 T
O
O
L
 
1 Determine context  Agree on definition 
2 Identify assets and goals  
3 Collect artifacts 
4 Gather security requirements  Perform risk assessment 
5 Select elicitation techniques 
6 Elicit requirements  
7 Analyze requirements  Categorize requirements  
8 Prioritize requirements  
9 Impact requirements  
In order to simplify the tool analysis process we will take the same example that we have used in 
CORAS tool about Telemedicine. The example was of securing the health records in 
telemedicine system that includes two core actors i.e. IT personnel and general practitioner 
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(technician). SQUARE tool however provides with a generic template for requirement 
elicitation, which can be useful for several projects but does not provide the artifacts or diagrams 
that we need for this example. So to fulfill the requirement we will try to generate the closest 
results possible to test this tool.   
 
Figure ‎4-8 Steps in SQUARE tool > Adapted from (Ganguly, 2011) 
In step 1 of SQUARE tool we try to gather all the terms for the current project. For our example 
of telemedicine we use almost same terms as in example demonstrated in (Ganguly, 2011) video. 
In step 2 of SQUARE tool we gather assets and goals mentioned in Table  4-5 
 
 
Figure ‎4-9 Step 1 SQUARE tool > Adapted from (Ganguly, 2011) 
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Table ‎4-5 Assets and goals SQUARE tool 
 Priority  Goals Assets 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 A
N
D
 
G
O
A
L
S
 
1 Apply input validation; Encrypt data; Improve 
training; Set code of conduct. 
Health records 
2 Apply input validation to avoid wrong 
prescription 
Patients health 
3 Revise access control list Provision of tele-cardiology 
service  
In step 3 of SQUARE tool we gather artifacts which in comparison with SSAP’s is the 
awareness. The literature can be for report on telemedicine code of conduct, or case study for 
telemedicine current security specifications.  
In step 4 of SQUARE tool perform risk assessment the risks are been associated with artifacts 
and goals. Table  4-6 adds in one additional column for risks associated with goals and assets 
mentioned in Table  4-5. 
Table ‎4-6 Perform risk assessment SQUARE tool 
 Prior
ity  
Goals Assets Risks 
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
 R
IS
K
 
A
S
S
E
S
S
M
E
N
T
 
1 Apply input validation; Encrypt 
data; Improve training; Set code of 
conduct. 
Health records Theft of health 
records 
2 Apply input validation to avoid 
wrong prescription 
Patients health Risk associated 
with patients life 
3 Revise access control list Provision of tele-
cardiology service  
Tele-cardiology 
service 
unavailability  
In step 5 of SQUARE tool elicitation techniques the tool provides a mechanism to choose 
elicitation technique by asking ten standardize questions to which answers provide privacy 
requirements generated. That then can be associated with risks and goals. The Figure  4-10 shows 
an example of associating requirement that has been generated by the SQUARE tool.  
 
Figure ‎4-10 Elicitation Techniques SQUARE tool > Adapted from (Ganguly, 2011) 
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In step 6 elicit requirements SQUARE tool uses the same generated requirements elicited in 
elicitation technique, for the further uses. See Figure  4-11 that depicts elicited security 
requirements. The step 7 is about categorizing these elicited requirements, in Figure  4-12 a 
requirement with an example can be seen needs to be categorized.  
 
Figure ‎4-11 Elicit Requirements SQUARE tool > Adapted from (Ganguly, 2011) 
 
Figure ‎4-12 Categorize Requirements SQUARE tool > Adapted from (Ganguly, 2011) 
In step 8 prioritize requirements we use to prioritize these requirements, in terms of severity or 
criticality. And finally in step 9 inspect requirements, SQUARE implements a mechanism for 
inspection.  
Getting close to the available results, we can assume that most the requirements were been 
fulfilled with some exceptions Table  4-7 shows the requirement ID, requirement name, 
fulfillment description and means to fulfill requirements from this tool. Requirements fulfillment 
from SQUARE tool can also be seen in Figure  4-13. 
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Table ‎4-7 Requirements from SQUARE tool 
REQ 
ID 
Requirement 
Name 
Requirement fulfillment description Means to fulfill requirement 
(Status) 
SR001 Making 
awareness 
SQUARE tool in step 3 provides with the 
“collect artifact” which can be used to 
store information for making awareness or 
available case-studies. So we make this 
requirement to be fulfilled.  
1. Resources available at 
http://www.cert.org/cyber
security-
engineering/products-
services/square.cfm? 
2. Methodology (SQUARE) 
3. Agree on definitions 
(gather terms) 
4. Collect artifact (Check 
list) 
SR002 Understanding 
context and 
assets 
In step 2 and 4 SQUARE tool provides 
means to declare assets and goals that 
gives understanding that this tool fulfills 
this requirement.  
1. Identify assets and goals 
(check list of assets & 
goals) 
2. Template to document 
assets & goals   
SR003 Security 
requirements 
During step 5 to 8 SQUARE tool uses 
questions to analyze the security needs. 
Based on the answers tool provides with a 
standard template that can be customized 
according to the needs. We can make this 
requirement to be fulfilled also 
1. Select elicitation 
technique 
2. Template for security 
requirements  
SR004 Risk analysis In step 4 of SQUARE tool “perform risk 
assessment” we have defined few risks 
based on assets and goals. That leads us to 
fulfill this requirement also 
1. Check list of 
vulnerabilities  
2. Check list of security 
threats 
3. Check list of risks 
4. Template to define risks  
SR005 Secure design 
practices 
SQUARE tool does not provide any thing 
about design practices, which leads us to 
fail this requirement 
-NA 
SR006 Justify design 
solution 
SQUARE tool in steps 7 & 8 provides with 
the concept of categorizing and prioritizing 
security requirements. That could be the 
part of justified design solution. In this 
case tool fulfills this requirement.   
1. Security requirements 
categorization and 
prioritization 
SR007 Response In step 9 of SQUARE tool called inspect 
requirement, gives a possibility for 
inspection which can be used as a response 
plan. That makes us to fulfill this 
requirement. 
1. Inspect requirement (can 
be used as a response plan 
also) 
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Figure ‎4-13 Requirements fulfillment from SQUARE tool 
4.2.3. Capabilities of SecTro2 Tool 
“Secure Tropos is a security-aware software systems development methodology, which 
combines requirements engineering concepts, such as actor, goal, plan together with security 
engineering concepts such as threat, security constraint and security mechanism, under a unified 
process to support the analysis and development of secure and trustworthy software systems” 
(Secure Tropos, 2014). SecTro2 tool is a security requirements elicitation tool that is based on 
Tropos methodology.  
SecTro2 enables software analysts to gather requirements providing various artifacts available in 
tool. These artifacts are categorized under organizational view, security requirements view, 
security components view, security attacks view, and cloud analysis view. In appendix-A 
SecTro2’s artifacts are depicted.  
To make it simpler we will introduce the same example of telemedicine available in (Lund, et al., 
2011) to demonstrate the capabilities of SecTro2 tool. As the tool adapts different approach, the 
results may vary from the original. At first we have tried to create the organizational view which 
can be seen in Figure  4-14 where in organization (telemedicine) a general practitioner is 
dedicated to store the health records and IT personnel is dedicated to keep these records safe.  
In Figure  4-15 security requirements view is depicted in comparison to CORAS tool this diagram 
represents accidental threats. Where two actors’ general practitioner and IT personnel are 
responsible for keeping health records, patient’s health, and provision of tele-cardiology service 
safe. In regards to keep system running they need to implement some security constraints, which 
are “keep health records safe”, “implement input validation” and “proper configuration of the 
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system”. Moreover both tools CORAS and SecTro2 have some differences so we only can depict 
the deliberate and accidental threat in one “security attacks view”. However the security attacks 
view is only for defining the attack scenario.  
 
Figure ‎4-14 Organization View 
When expending the threats mentioned in Figure  4-15 security attacks view can be seen, which 
then allows to introduce vulnerabilities, attack method, and attack scenario. We have security 
attacks view for all four threats mentioned in Figure  4-15 that can be seen from Figure  4-16 to 
Figure  4-19. 
In Figure  4-16 scenario is depicted where improper handling of health records leads to health 
records been sent to unauthorized personnel. Two vulnerabilities mentioned “insufficient 
training” and “possibility of irregular handling of health records” are responsible for this 
incident. Figure  4-17 is similar to Figure  4-16 in regards with they both mention the improper 
handling of health record.  
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Figure ‎4-15 Security Requirements View – Accidental threat 
 
Figure ‎4-16 Security Attacks View - Health records sent to unauthorized people 
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Figure ‎4-17 Security Attacks View - Health records copies stored on local computer 
 
Figure ‎4-18 Security Attacks View - Wrong input in health records 
In Figure  4-18 scenario is depicted where a practitioner inputs the wrong information in health 
records, making unreliable health records, two vulnerabilities are responsible for this a no input 
validation, and pros-based health records.  
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Figure ‎4-19 Security Attacks View - Misconfiguration of system 
Misconfiguration of system can make tele-cardiology service unavailable in Figure  4-19 scenario 
where a brute force attack and insufficient access control can lead to service unavailability.  
 
Figure ‎4-20 Security Requirements View – Deliberate Threat 
In comparison to CORAS deliberate threat diagram, Figure  4-20 presents a view which includes 
an eavesdropper and hacker, that can be seen in Figure  4-21 and Figure  4-22. Telemedicine 
system has two soft goals, keep health records safe and restrict unauthorized connection. These 
are linked to security constraint “data privacy” and “secure connection”.  
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Figure ‎4-21 Security Attacks View - System Break-in 
In Figure  4-21 system break-in is depicted which provides a view on how insufficient security 
can lead to loss of valuable information, where hacker tries to break-in to the system by using 
brute-force method. 
 
Figure ‎4-22 Security Attacks View - Eavesdropping on dedicated connection 
In Figure  4-22 an eavesdropper tries to listen to unprotected connection of telemedicine which 
can lead to loss of health records. 
In example we have learned how SecTro2 provide users with different views that can be useful 
in demonstrating and eliciting security requirements. Our motive of “means to fulfill 
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requirements” from SSAP’s to security engineering tools can now be seen in Table  4-8 for 
SecTro2 tool. Requirements fulfillment from SecTro2 can also be seen in Figure  4-23. 
Table ‎4-8 Requirements from SecTro2 
REQ 
ID 
Requirement 
Name 
Requirement fulfillment description Means to fulfill requirement 
(Status) 
SR001 Making 
awareness 
SecTro2 is adapting Tropos methodology, 
which means the tool follows security 
engineering methodology. Also offers 
online leaning resources at 
http://securetropos.org/ 
1. Resources available at 
http://securetropos.org/ 
2. Methodology (Secure 
Tropos) 
3. User manual 
4. Publications 
http://securetropos.org/pu
blications/  
SR002 Understanding 
context and 
assets 
In most diagrams the resource artifact is 
used which itself shows that tool provides 
the understanding of Assets. See Figure 
 4-15 for e.g. In this case SecTro2 fulfills 
this requirement.  
1. Context diagram (security 
requirements view) 
2. Asset diagram (security 
requirements view) 
SR003 Security 
requirements 
In Figure  4-15 and Figure  4-20 security 
constraint artifact is used which can 
represent the security requirements. So 
SecTro2 also fulfill this requirement.  
1. Security requirements 
view 
SR004 Risk analysis Figure  4-21 and Figure  4-22 shows the 
threat and vulnerability artifact, which in 
Figure  4-15 is only depicts the risk 
associated “health records have been sent 
to unauthorized person”. Mitigations can 
be seen when expended. SecTro2 fulfill 
this requirement also.  
1. Threat diagram (security 
attacks view) 
SR005 Secure design 
practices 
SecTro2 does not include anything related 
to secure software architecture, but as it 
includes security components view that 
can be useful in terms of defining security 
mechanism which in return will suggest 
secure design mechanism. That leads us to 
consider this requirement as fulfilled. 
1. Security components 
diagram (security 
components view) 
SR006 Justify design 
solution 
SecTro2 does not contain anything related 
to trade-off analysis, likelihood of certain 
event or anything related to justification of 
design. That means SecTro2 fails this 
requirement.  
-NA 
SR007 Response If we consider artifact security constraint 
and using security mechanism artifact, one 
can create a response plan. We can 
consider this requirement as fulfilled.  
1. Security response 
diagram (security 
requirements view) 
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Figure ‎4-23 Requirements fulfillment from SECTRO2 tool 
4.3. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter we have introduced three software security requirements elicitation tools, and 
tested against requirements gathered from software security assurance processes (SSAP’s), and 
came up with the means to fulfill those requirements. In conclusion we have gathered all the 
required instruments to construct a framework. That will help in choosing the right security 
requirements elicitation tool. Coming up next we will define a method to choose between 
security requirements elicitation tools. 
 45  
 
  
Framework for security requirements engineering tool 
In the previous chapter we have finalized analyzing the tools against SSAP’s which gave us 
understanding on how the tools elicit security requirements. Based on these findings we can now 
develop a method which will enable us to construct a framework to choose security engineering 
tools based on these requirements. In Figure  5-2 the framework can be visited that is constructed 
with the help of tool analysis against requirements available in Table  5-1. In the last part of this 
chapter we have discussed about the usage of this framework that can be visited in Figure  5-2. 
5.1. Derived Software Security Requirements 
In chapter 3 we have analyzed SSAP’s and gather the requirements for security engineering 
tools. In this chapter we have combined all these requirements to form one table. Requirements 
shown in Table  5-1 are based on SDL, 7 Touch points and OWASP, where original requirements 
are mentioned along with base artifact. Requirements for security engineering processes are 
divided into phases of software development, originally the phases in Microsoft SDL. This 
combined outcome from SSAP’s has been enriched with means to fulfill these requirements from 
previous chapter of tools analysis. The table structure is same as tables in SSAP’s, requirement 
ID with additional ID from SSAP, artifact name, and finally the actual requirement with precise 
description.   
Table ‎5-1 Derived Requirements from SSAP 
REQ 
ID 
PREQ ID Artifact  Requirement  
PH1: Training 
SR001 *SRS001 Core Training (Making Awareness) 
Tool should provide basic training material that will help 
understand the implementation of security solution. 
 
#SRC001 
Institute 
Awareness 
program 
PH2: Requirements and use cases  
SR002  
*SRS002 
Establish security 
and privacy 
(Understand context and assets) 
Tool should provide the means of establishing security 
5 
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 requirements requirements, defining minimum criteria for security in the 
developed application. 
 
+SRT005 Abuse cases 
 
#SRC002 
Perform 
Application 
Assessment 
SR003 *SRS004 
 
 
Perform security 
and privacy risk 
assessment 
(Security Requirements) 
Tool should be able to provide means of examining software 
design based on cost and regulatory requirements. 
+SRT002 Risk analysis, 
#SRC003 Capture Security 
Requirements  
SR004 *SRS008 Use threat 
modeling 
(Risk Analysis) 
Tool should be able to provide structured approach to threat 
scenarios, i.e. identification of security vulnerabilities, and 
determining risks from these threats, and establishing 
appropriate mitigation. 
 
+SRT002 Risk analysis 
#SRC005 Build 
Vulnerability 
Remediation 
Procedures 
PH3: Architecture and design 
SR005 *SRS005 
 
Establish design 
requirements 
(Secure design practices) 
Tool should provide means of adopting and implementing 
secure design (architecture) techniques.  
#SRC004 
Implement Secure 
Development 
Practices 
PH4: Test and test results (Verification) 
SR006 *SRS014 Conduct attack 
surface review 
(Justify design solution) 
Tool should provide means for risk measurement and trade-
off analysis. +SRT002 Risk analysis 
 
#SRC006 
Define and 
monitor metrics 
PH5: Release  
SR007 *SRS015 
 
Create incident 
response plan 
(Response) 
Tool should provide means of response plan to address new 
threats. #SRC007 Publish 
Operational 
Security 
Guidelines 
Legend: Requirement ID lookup 
*: SDL  
+: Seven Touch Points 
#: OWASP 
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1. SR001: Making awareness 
Security requirement “making awareness” plays very important role in security 
requirements elicitation. It is at the beginning of our means to fulfill requirements also 
the part of most SSAP’s. This step not only gives involved actors, knowledge about 
security but also provides with basic information like terms, artifacts and methodology. 
One can learn from the fact that this requirement should be performed at all times, to 
reduce the chances of mistakes, while following standards and code of conduct will lead 
to development of secure software. 
In cases when this step is missing or not performed very well, it is possible that different 
mindset of a team can come-up with different solutions and may not be on the same 
mindset. That will lead to delays in development cycle and also adds up to the threat of 
implementing vulnerabilities into software unintentionally. Making awareness can 
provide team with an opportunity to learn about various forms of vulnerabilities, risks, 
threats, mitigations, and treatments. Moreover it will also provide an opportunity to 
update the team with newer risks etc. for example if a team is outdated with the threat of 
writing vulnerable code by using old technique of  encrypted MD5 authentication, and 
not using salt technique of encryption can compromise privacy. As MD5 encrypted hash 
can easily be transformed into the static text with online engines available. For reference 
see (MD5ONLINE, 2014).  
2. SR002: Understand context and assets 
Security requirement “understand context and assets” is the basic part for security 
requirement elicitation. It provides with the understanding of assets involved or at stake 
during in a particular situation. Understanding context is important because from the 
context one can start analyzing the scenario, and will be able to perform actions 
accordingly. In this step goals for the security concerns are mainly jot down, that will be 
kept until the end of development cycle.  
Loosely implementation of this step can cause several problems, as this step will be the 
basis for the future steps in these requirements, where the basic concept of security will 
be defined. In simple words a solid abstract of complete system will be based on context 
and assets. The context actually is an idea that provides the basis for an event i.e. more 
the concrete form of idea is, the clear form of details can extracted from it. In some cases 
the assets are been overlooked because of not been considered as vulnerable to outside 
world. One example in this can be of dumpster diving as the cases related to this were 
more often overlooked and/or not considered as threat. A code of conduct should be 
followed to better understand assets as oppose to assumptions.  
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3. SR003: Security requirements 
This step “security requirement” involves with the function of identifying elicitation 
technique, which is important because there are several elicitation techniques available. If 
in case elicitation technique has not been defined it will always confuse analyst and they 
will be using various techniques which in end will add up to efforts. Security 
requirements also include treatment for the particular security requirement. Treatment of 
these threats will provide with the basic understanding of how the system should be 
secured in terms of malice activities. 
First and foremost in order to elicit security requirements one needs an elicitation 
method. Among all available methods which one to choose from? This can be a difficult 
question. It is wise to ask several questions before choosing an elicitation method. 
Questions like: what are the actors involved? Who is the user? And what kind of security 
treatment stakeholders want to achieve? Answers to these questions can provide with the 
basic understanding of elicitation method. For example if stakeholders need is to achieve 
secure database, the method of eliciting security requirement could be a structured 
interviews with stakeholders: see following for reference and more (SQUARE Method, 
2014). On the other hand not having an elicitation method can have several side effects 
like: recording unclear or incomplete security requirement.  
4. SR004: Risk analysis 
Security requirement “risk assessment” in this step risks are been specified in details. 
While risk is the combination of asset, threat, and vulnerability one missing component 
of vulnerabilities analysis can be performed to fulfill risk assessment. One risk can be 
composed of several threats and vulnerabilities. So the best way to analyze risk is to point 
out as much vulnerabilities as possible, and also threats. This will lead to a concrete risk 
that can be understood very well in the later stages.  
There are three components contributing to the construction of the risk: value of related 
assets, number of threats possible and number of vulnerabilities. The more detailed these 
three components are the more concrete risks can be defined. The basic concept of 
defining concrete risk is to provide with an opportunity to define appropriate treatment. A 
badly or wrongly stated risk can cause to construct inappropriate treatment or solution 
that in result will not be able to resolve the actual issue. Moreover it will also add up to 
time and efforts spent on treatment that actually didn’t resolve the problem.  
5. SR005: Secure design practices 
In step “secure design practices” architecture identification should be performed 
according to the treatment needs. For example if the software requires a database then 
architectural suggestions will be to implement stored procedures. In this step coding 
standards can also be fixed, as different coding styles may distract developers working on 
the same project. Moreover security components like defining security mechanism are the 
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part of secure design practices, because security mechanism actually informs in detail on 
how the security requirement shall be implemented.  
There are several possible ways of building software architecture, i.e. secure software 
design architecture will offer the skeleton of software that will include secure database 
(implementation of stored procedures, encrypted data, etc.), inheritance/encapsulation of 
code, and possibility to implement input validation. Not having standard secure software 
design architecture will always create possibility of writing vulnerable code that could 
lead to an unwanted incident. Moreover secure architecture will always have the basic 
security mechanisms already implemented. A good example in this context is of 
Microsoft’s SDL process template (Microsoft, 2014) that enables basic security 
requirements already implemented.  
6. SR006: Justify design solution 
In this step of “justify design solutions” one suggestion is to perform trade-off analysis 
which will give weight to the software features. The feature with highest weight will be 
developed first. This will always save time and efforts, and also give chance to decide 
what features are more important. In this step risk estimations should also be performed 
because this will weigh the highest risks.  And the risks with the highest ranking should 
be addressed first. It also includes the prioritization of security requirements that will 
suggest what requirements should be taken first.  
Not having categorized or prioritized security requirements can create unwanted queue of 
incomplete work items, because work items are mostly related on each other i.e. not 
having authentication feature in initial stages will be time consuming to implement in 
later stages, as authentication is responsible to maintain user session. Another possibility 
of having justified design is to perform calculus of trade-off analysis that can create 
possibility to reduce unimportant features. This also creates an option of estimating risks 
that can help in making high risks at the highest priority.  
7. SR007: Response 
Step “response” provides with the plan that can be used at times of an incident. Response 
plan is important because during an incident there will be less time to react. In times of 
unwanted incident, unavailability of response plan can cause delays in the fix and in 
some situations can cause failure also.  
Response plan will always be handy when it comes to face unwanted incident. The 
reason behind is the nature of unwanted event being uncertain in most cases. For example 
an event that could cause the loss of data, can have a response plan stating steps to 
recover backed up data.  
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5.2. Means to fulfill the requirements  
In previous chapter we analyzed three security requirements elicitation tools, from which we get 
to construct means to fulfill those requirements. Figure  5-1 shows all the possible means that 
have been fulfilled against requirements fulfillment from Table  5-1. The parent boxes shows the 
actual requirements that we have collected during analysis of SSAP’s, under which several 
means are depicted, we have constructed the means as close to possible functionality available in 
the tools. However some additional suggestions are also mentioned for example use of secure 
software architecture, and trade-off analysis etc.  
Moreover there could be several other means to fulfill requirements from Table  5-1 however our 
scope is limited to evaluate the tools that gave us most the requirements blocks fulfilled. The 
means to fulfill are based on experiments/example done in previous chapters that could also lead 
to more findings. But due to limited available time to do experiment we have collected as much 
means as possible from the security engineering tools. We will discuss about the means one by 
one in detail also, that will give us understanding on how the means/features actually work. 
Moreover we will determine the measurement scale for these means that will be helpful in rating 
the tools.  
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Figure ‎5-1 Evaluation Framework 
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 SR001: Making awareness 
 Online Resource 
In all analyzed tools one common mean is of availability of online resources, which 
include the online presence of the tools, procedures related to tool, and documentations. 
All of these tools are available to download for free, along with documentations which 
could give security engineering tools an edge to be adapted very easily.  
 Scientific Publications 
All three tools have adapted a methodology, and have several publications. More related 
to software security, cloud security, updates to methodology are the most common topic 
of publications among these tools. Scientific publications can add up to increase in 
awareness using various aspects of security engineering.   
 Book on Methodology 
In all three tools only CORAS provide with the book on methodology, however other two 
have publications for methodology. This gives CORAS tool an edge over other tools, and 
provide with simplified explanation of methodology in book itself.  
 Hands on Wizards 
SQUARE tool is built in a way that it provides with several guided wizards for 
information. However these wizards can also be customized to upload contents related to 
specific software. That can help in learning the aspects of tools as well as software build.  
 User Manual 
A user manual is type of dictionary for specific tool, in this case SECTRO2 provides with 
the manual to support and guide users with artifacts available in tool. It includes abstract 
definition on how an artifact can be used in particular context. It can be handy in 
situations where one wants to experience all the available artifacts of the tool. Certainly 
SECTRO2 has edge over two other tools in this feature.   
 Tutorials 
A tutorial is a guided plan to support a work process from beginning to the end. In most 
cases there is only tutorial which kick-start the learning curve really fast. In 
documentation of CORAS tool there are some tutorials available to teach users with the 
basics of the tool. This can be handy in situation where stakeholders want to start 
working on the tool as soon as possible. Unlike user manual tutorial in most cases can 
teach faster. CORAS tool has edge over other tools in this context.  
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 SR002: Understand context and assets 
 Asset Diagram 
An asset diagram is to identify assets related to the software security. It is crucial to have 
clear definitions of assets that can help in defining the concrete goals for software 
security. Not having asset diagram can lead to ambiguity in valuable assets and in some 
cases can lead to overlooking of some valuable assets. CORAS & SECTRO2 provide 
with the asset diagram which gives these two tools edge over SQURE. But also 
SQUARE tool have means to define assets that can be taken as substitute for the diagram. 
 Checklist of Assets & Goals 
In SQUARE tool there is way to define assets and goals, in tables. That can be handy in 
cases of definitions for these two aspects of software security. As this tool does not 
include any diagrams, the check lists and tables are the means to define assets and goals.  
 Template to Document Assets & Goals 
SQUARE tool also provide with the predefined common assets and goals in common 
software that can save time via avoid writing additional assets and goals. The template 
however can be customized and molded according to the current software security needs.  
 SR003: Security requirements 
 Treatment Diagram 
A treatment diagram provide with the feature of defining treatments to the possible 
vulnerabilities, unwanted incident, and risks. CORAS and SECTRO2 provide with the 
functionality of depicting treatments in tools with the help of available artifacts for 
treatment. One can create security requirements as treatments to the possible 
vulnerabilities and risks. CORAS and SECTRO2 has an edge over SQURE tool in this 
aspect of security engineering.  
 Select Elicitation Technique 
Choosing elicitation technique from several available techniques can sometimes be a 
difficult process. SQUARE tool provide with the mechanism to overcome this difficulty 
by adding a questioner that can suggest the elicitation according to the stakeholder needs. 
This gives SQUARE tool and edge over two other tools.  
 Template for Security Requirements 
As there are no diagrams in SQUARE tool, again the way of capturing security 
requirements is done using the template. The template in SQUARE tool provides with the 
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most common security requirements already built-in. That in return can save time and 
efforts to capture many additional requirements.  
 SR004: Risk analysis 
 Risk Diagram 
A risk diagram is to depict the associated risk with the software. This process of depicting 
risks is handy because it provides with the basic understating of the common risks, which 
could lead to writing concrete threats and vulnerabilities. CORAS provides with the 
means to depict risks inside the tool using available artifacts. That gives this tool an 
advantage over other two. 
 Threat Diagram  
A threat diagram is to define details of several threats that are associated with the 
particular risk. It provides the understanding of the malice actors also, that are outside the 
system. In case of uncertain or defining unclear threats could lead to bad description of 
the risk or also can make a risk that is not concrete enough. CORAS and SECTRO2 tools 
have this feature inbuilt to depict threats in diagrams, which gives these tools advantage 
over SQUARE tool.  
 Checklist of Vulnerabilities/Security threats/Risks  
SQUARE tool also provide with the means of defining vulnerabilities, threats, and risks 
in terms of checklist. That can be in some cases an easy access because a risk is 
composed of vulnerabilities, threats and assets, and in SQUARE tool these all are 
associated also.  
 Template to Define Risks 
SQUARE tool also provide with the means of pre-defined risks in expression of a 
template this contains most common types of risks. A template with already available 
risks can be handy because this can save time and efforts for the team.  
 SR005: Secure design practices 
 Security Components  
A security component is a method to define security mechanism. This kind of approach 
can provide with the possibility to define how to deal with the particular security 
requirement. SECTRO2 provides with the possibility to create security components and 
depict them in details for better understanding.  
 List of Possible Architecture/Solution for Secure Software Design 
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A type of software architecture can be a crucial step in making secure software, because a 
design of software decides the security level of the particular software. Possibility to 
choose from different software architecture style can resolve several security related 
problems from the beginning. However this feature is not available in any of the tool, but 
the idea is to implement a questioner like in “choosing elicitation technique” feature, and 
answer to those questions will suggest which type of software design architecture should 
best suite with the current scenario. This will in end save time and efforts applied to 
choosing one software architecture style.  
 SR006: Justify design solution 
 Risk Estimation Method 
A risk estimation method provides with the possibility to calculate the severity of 
particular risk. And based on this analysts can decide which risk should be addressed at 
foremost. This can also give an opportunity to decide whether the risk is relevant in 
current context or not. Having possibility to calculate risk estimation inside the tool can 
be very handy, but current tools does not provide any functionality that addresses this 
issue. Only CORAS methodology suggests some calculus for likelihood calculations that 
can rate risks accordingly.  
 Security Requirements Categorization/Prioritization 
One aspect of justified design is to give clarifications for the particular security 
requirements. This can be achieved by categorizing and prioritizing security requirements 
based on severity or likelihood. SQAURE tool gives an opportunity to deal with this 
solution by providing the table that includes categorization and prioritization of security 
requirements. This gives an edge to SQUARE tool on other two.  
 Trade-off Analysis 
The function of trade-off analysis is to decide whether a particular feature will add up a 
value to the software security. For example what features can be given up if the time 
duration for the software development is limited. Trade-off analysis can also be handy in 
situations where budget allotted to the project is limited and features that should be 
implemented are more than the budget. This feature is not available in any of the tools 
that we have analyzed, however having such functionality can help in decision making.  
 SR007: Response 
 Means to Construct Response Plan 
A response plan is to provide solutions for unwanted incident. CORAS tool provide with 
this feature to depict a response plan also using the existing artifacts. However tool does 
not suggest such type of diagram but one can create a response plan using available 
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artifacts. This will always provide analyst with the solution or steps to do in situation of 
an incident.  
 Template for Inspect Requirements  
Inspection of security requirements can actually provide with an opportunity to improve 
future security requirements. As old security requirements will become obsolete in future, 
new security requirements can be improved by learning lessons from old ones. An 
inspection can also provide with the opportunity to verify if the requirement is actually 
fulfilled or not. SQUARE tool has an edge over other tools in this aspect.  
5.3. Measurement Scale for tool Analysis 
Based on the research done in (Matulevičius, et al., 2009) that discuss about QualOSS quality 
model that for developing a systematic quality model to assess robustness and scale of evolution 
of the OSS (open source software). In similar way we will try to give scale to means that we 
have discovered in order to provide an opportunity to measure the tool reliability. Below we have 
developed scaling. However in later discoveries, the scale will be based on the importance of the 
feature also.  
In order to calculate the total measure of a particular tool one can answer to the sample questions 
given in Table  5-3, Table  5-4, Table  5-5, Table  5-6, Table  5-7, Table  5-8, and Table  5-9. For 
which we can then be able to calculate the rating of tool. The rating goes like from “no support” 
possesses 0 point and “full support” possesses 3 points and all others accordingly. The rating can 
also be seen in Table  5-2. The features priority is important also, as some tools support 
interactive methods to create diagrams, whereas some tools provides with the similar means but 
with no interactive diagrams. We prioritize features according to their importance in security 
engineering tools and also according to the ease of use.  
The rating will then be multiplied with the feature priority to get the score for particular question. 
And then we can sum them to get the total score for the requirement. Finally sum of all the 
score’s obtained from requirements will be taken as the final score for that tool.  
Table ‎5-2 Measurement Legend 
Feature satisfaction Description Rating 
Full Support The feature is fully supported with no complications at all. 
And results gained by using particular feature are complete, 
concrete, and satisfactory. 
3 
Above Average Support The feature is partially supported, indicating that there could 
be some additions made to enable full support. 
2 
Minimal Support The feature is supported to the extent that it only fulfills the 
criteria of availability, which means it does not satisfies and 
simplifies the process.  
1 
No Support The feature is not supported at all.  0 
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Table ‎5-3 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
Sample questions Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and 
documentation? 
I/6  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To‎what‎extent‎this‎tools’‎book‎on‎
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool provides support 
for the user manual? 
III/4  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool provides 
tutorials? That will support and provide 
learning opportunity.  
IV/3  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool has gained 
popularity to support and provide 
several publications?  
V/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool provides support 
for hands on wizards? These will guide 
engineers through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
Table ‎5-4 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context and Assets 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool supports the 
feature to create asset diagram, or at-
least include a feature similar to declare 
assets in efficient way?  
I/3  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports the 
feature that includes a template to 
document assets and goals?  
II/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To which extent this tool supports the 
feature to create checklist of assets and 
goals?    
III/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
Table ‎5-5 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool supports the 
feature to create treatment diagram, or 
at-least include a feature similar to 
declare treatments in efficient way?  
I/3  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports the 
feature that can help selecting security 
requirements elicitation techniques?   
II/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
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To what extent this tool supports 
template to document security 
requirements?  
III/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
Table ‎5-6 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool supports feature 
to create risk diagram, or at-least include 
a feature similar to declare risks in 
efficient way?    
I/4  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To which extent this tool supports feature 
to create threat diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare 
threats in efficient way?   
II/3  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports 
template to document risks?  
III/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports feature 
to create checklist of vulnerabilities, 
security threats and risks? 
IV/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
Table ‎5-7 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design Practices 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool supports the 
feature to create security mechanism, or 
at-least include a feature similar to 
declare security mechanism in efficient 
way?   
I/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports the 
feature that can help selecting secure 
software architecture and secure 
software design? 
II/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
Table ‎5-8 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk 
estimations?  
I/3  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports feature 
that can help categorizing and 
prioritizing security requirements?  
II/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports 
mechanism to estimate trade-off 
analysis? 
III/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
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Table ‎5-9 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
Sample questions  Priority 
/Score 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
To what extent this tool supports feature 
that can help creating response plan?  
I/2  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
To what extent this tool supports feature 
to create templates for security 
requirements inspection?  
II/1  
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
 
☐ 
5.4. Use of Evaluation Framework 
The means to fulfill requirements can be used as a framework if someone wants to evaluate 
security requirements engineering tool. This can help in specifying the best tool, on the basis of 
fulfillments. The audience of this framework shall be software architects and analysts, who are 
responsible for making requirements elicitation based decisions. There are four steps in choosing 
best SRE tool, step one is to refer to initialize requirements, step two is searching for the 
available tools for SRE. In step three analysts can evaluate tool one by one and specify available 
features in correspondence with the evaluation framework and rate them. In step four analysts 
can choose the tool with the highest ratings.    
Use of this framework is depicted in Figure  5-2 in which we have made a simple process to 
evaluate security requirements engineering tool. When analyst gets instruction to decide on the 
SRE tool, he will first initiate the requirements, and list down all the fulfillments that should be 
available in a particular SRE tool. Then he can start searching for the available SRE tools mostly 
it comes from online source i.e. internet research. The next part can be time consuming and 
possess the actual value in use of the evaluation framework, in this step analyst has to use the 
tool one by one and rate them according to the features listed from step one. The next step is 
simple analyst only have to choose the best tool based on highest rating. Finally analyst has the 
tool and decision has been made.  
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Figure ‎5-2 Use of Evaluation Framework 
 STEP1: Requirements Initialization 
In this step user can analyze available steps in SRE tool evaluation framework, which 
will then be used as a reference for features to look for in a SRE tool. The importance of 
this step is of getting startup information about security engineering tools. For example: 
in order to find out the SRE tool the evaluation framework will help point out the major 
processes and features involved. This can make a clear distinction in the tool from others. 
One can use this step when decision to search for SRE tool has made, but properties of 
SRE tool are unknown. 
 STEP2: Search for SRE tools 
This step is also important because searching for available tools can be a tedious process, 
however by finishing the first step user will be able to get some ideas about tool 
functionalities that can be useful to distinguish between SRE tools and RE tools. This 
step might take lot of time because of changing trends in requirement engineering 
technology. The major means for searching SRE tools include internet search, contact 
and references, and previous knowledge.  
 STEP3: Use the tool to evaluate how well it corresponds to features listed in 
framework 
This step plays as an engine for the work flow in use of evaluation framework, because in 
this step user has to use tools and rate the features by answering questioners. The 
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example questioners can be seen from Table  5-3 to Table  5-9. After rating the available 
features, it then will be multiplied by with the priority. Finally that particular tool’s 
section score should be summed to get the total score. This step is regressive also because 
during analysis there should be more than one tool in the list to analyze.   
 STEP4: Choose the tool with highest rating 
In this step user only have to choose the tool with highest ratings that were achieved from 
previous step. In order to determine which tool would correspond and fulfill the features 
efficiently the score should be made as precise as possible.  
5.5. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have constructed the means to fulfill SSAP’s requirements using security 
engineering tools in other words evaluation framework for choosing security engineering tool 
that can be visited in Figure  5-1. Along with that we have created measurement for the tool, to 
evaluate the tool according to features. Finally we have discussed about the use of evaluation 
framework, and discusses on how to use this framework that can be visited in Figure  5-2.  
Coming up next we will test this framework using one instrument, and conclude this research 
work. 
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Tool Assessment 
In this chapter we will describe how tools were evaluated using two different frameworks, along 
with its application, and results. Rating the tool is an essential part of this research because it will 
allow users to choose between security engineering tools efficiently. The motive is to rate the 
tools according to their features reliability, completeness and ease of use.  In this regards we 
have chosen five tools that include three previous tools that have been discussed in chapter 4. 
Additional two tool that we are going to use in this experiment are STS-Tool (Arcsin, 2014) and 
Magic Draw (No Magic, 2014). In this regards we will use RE-Tool evaluation approach (R-
TEA) framework (Matulevičius, 2005) and framework created in previous chapter, security 
engineering tool evaluation framework (SETEF). Complete results of these tools and their score 
can be visited in appendix-B and appendix-C.  
6.1. Design of Experiment 
The experiment is designed in order to complete the tool evaluation using two different 
frameworks i.e. R-TEA (Matulevičius, 2005) and SETEF. There are four steps in this 
experiment, 1. Define requirements of experiment, 2. Assess tools using R-TEA (Matulevičius, 
2005), 3. Assess tools using SETEF, and 4. Compare results. See Figure  6-1 
 
Figure ‎6-1 Design of Experiment 
6 
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6.2. Assessment of the tools using R-TEA approach 
In assessment of the tools using R-TEA approach, there are several steps however we have 
chosen the most relevant/modified steps to this research work. Below are the steps involved in R-
TEA approach precisely discussed. 
6.2.1. Preparation of requirement specification 
This step involves gathering all the requirements according to the environmental needs, 
prioritizing these requirements according to importance of the feature, and finally based on 
elicitation and prioritization results team prepares the requirements specifications.  
6.2.2. Selection of business parties 
This step involves the investigation of the requirement engineering tool market according to 
external requirements. The evaluation team requests trail and demonstration RE-Tool version 
from the business parties (Matulevičius, 2005).  
6.2.3. Investigation of the tools 
This step involves analyzing the security engineering tools by using them. Rating is according to 
the features presence, ease of use, and completeness. These tools can be rated according to their 
features, and by summing all will give the total number for that particular tool.  
6.2.4. Decision 
Tool decision is based on their ranking, how good their score was in previous step of 
investigation, and will be chosen as the best tool. 
6.3. Assessment of the tools using SETEF 
6.3.1. Requirements Initialization  
This step is primary in analyzing tools using evaluation framework that is to collect all the 
requirements for the tool, in our case using available requirements and prioritizing them 
according to the need for feature. The process of prioritizing requirement is pretty simple just 
using requirements backlog one can identify the needs and from that an analysts will be able to 
identify what requirements for the tool should be at the highest priority.  
Priority given to features in our questioners is based on the ease of use, clarity, completeness and 
effectiveness of the feature. At first we start by giving score to individual feature comparing with 
other features in a particular requirement. And make the high priority feature a level up, which 
eventually sorted all the features according to their level of importance.   
6.3.2. Search for Tools 
Search for the tool is mostly based on internet search, in our case we have kept using Google 
search engine to find relevant security engineering tools. As security engineering tools are still 
not much popular, we were able to find 5 relevant tools. This process can be easier because of 
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less available tools currently. And also because security engineering tools are not yet widely 
used, search makes it simple to find them.  
6.3.3. Tool Evaluation  
In this step an evaluator has to use the tools in order to rate the features available in the tool. We 
have prioritized the features in step one already, which allows us to move forward to rate the 
features according to their availability, ease of use, and completeness. The evaluation was based 
on following an example which was provided in a tutorial by (Lund, et al., 2011) where a case of 
telemedicine was provided. Based on the tutorial we have constructed diagrams to analyze the 
features. And finally we have rated these features accordingly. Below are the analyses of tools 
we have used to analyze different set of tools.  
6.3.3.1. STS Tool 
STS-tool in this list has the most importance because this tool is unique from the tools we have 
analyzed so far, moreover this tool is security requirements gathering specific also. There are few 
artifacts in this tool, which enables most of the diagrams, from security risk to asset diagrams. 
These artifacts are agent, role, goal, document, and event. However this tool does not have 
complete set of artifacts to support all the features of security engineering tools. As the tool 
follows standard language for security requirements elicitation, which suggests fewer artifacts, 
this also makes the tool complete according to its method. In our assessment of tools, this tool 
gained 113 by R-TEA method and 80 by our method. See appendix-B and C for full results.    
6.3.3.2. CORAS Tool 
CORAS tool so far have the best score calculated using evaluation framework. That’s because 
the tool have most of the security engineering features at its best. Risk, asset, and treatment 
diagrams can easily be constructed, along with the proper naming for the artifacts. Moreover this 
tool provides with the likelihood status also, which is helpful in prioritizing requirements. 
However the tool does not correspond to same score via R-TEA approach. This tool has the base 
score of 99 using R-TEA and 109 according to SETEF calculations. See Appendix-B and C for 
full results.  
6.3.3.3. SQUARE Tool 
SQUARE tool follows different approach than all other tools it has forms, templates, wizards etc. 
instead of diagram. The tool gained highest score of 167 using R-TEA approach, but got least 
score of 75 using SETEF. According to SETEF this tool gained fewer score because we have 
prioritized the interactive features at high, and SQUARE tool do not have diagrams.  
6.3.3.4. SecTro2 Tool 
SecTro2 tool analysis is composed of different views, and inside these views, diagrams are sub-
grouped to distinguish between threats and their treatments. A view can be created for the 
organization and inside this organization, goals, assets, and threats are declared. And inside any 
of these threats, treatment can be viewed. Solely well-structured tool for security engineering, 
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which gained score of 102 according to R-TEA and 80 based on evaluation framework 
calculations. See Appendix-B and C for full results.   
6.3.3.5. Magic Draw Tool 
The purpose of Magic Draw is not for security engineering, however as the tool support UML 
extensively, historically this tool have been in use for every other requirement elicitations. The 
base for this tool is it allows users to create class, use case, activity diagrams which can be 
transformed to cater security engineering artifacts. For example one can create misuse-case 
diagram to declare threats, just by using use case diagram. Moreover this tool supports extensive 
variety of diagrams which gives this tool score of 110 based on R-TEA approach and 99 based 
on evaluation framework calculations. See Appendix-B and C for full results.  
6.3.4. Select the Best Tool 
The selection of best tool is based on the score they acquired from the analysis done using 
evaluation framework. One can also change the priorities to maintain the required features for 
the particular project. However one can also use priorities available in this research work, 
because priorities for features in use of evaluation framework are calculated based on their ease 
of use. The criteria for the best tool will always be the one with the highest score.  
6.4. Comparison of R-TEA and SETEF 
These two methods have similar nature in analyzing the security engineering tools. Where R-
TEA approach is addressed towards requirements engineering tools and SETEF focuses on sub-
category security requirements engineering tools. However these two methods follow different 
approach to analyze the tools, which effects the results obtained in the previous evaluation. R-
TEA approach is more focused towards language and complete specification of the requirements 
and SETEF declares interactive diagrams and clear specifications gathering as the primary 
objective. In previous evaluation of the tools, we these two methods followed some steps that 
can be seen in Table  6-1.   
Table ‎6-1 R-TEA and SETEF Steps 
Steps R-TEA SETEF 
1 Preparation of the requirements specification Requirement initialization 
2 Selection of the business parties Search for tools 
3 Investigation of the tools Tool Evaluation 
4 Decision  Best tool selection 
As oppose to SETEF requirements mentioned in Table  5-1 R-TEA suggests set of activities 
mentioned in Table  6-2. However these two cannot be compared because of differences, but few 
activities like (requirements must have a unique identifier) can be seen are common. While both 
approaches are addressing different aspects of requirements engineering, most of the activities in 
both are diverse. This gives us a strong reason that results obtained are oppose to each other, see 
Table  6-3. 
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Table ‎6-2 Activities of R-TEA > Adapted from (Matulevičius,‎2005) 
Dimensions Activities in R-TEA 
Representation dimension 
1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using informal language 
1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal language 
1.3 Specify requirements using formal language  
1.4 Define traceable associations between requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and systems, by supporting interoperable 
protocols and standards 
Agreement dimension 
2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive baseline version; and engage a 
mechanism to authenticate and approve change requests 
2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined groupings  
2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work between members of a 
multidisciplinary team, which may be geographically distributes 
2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of all project components and 
requirements in a shared repository 
Specification dimension 
3.1 Collect and store a common system’s and a product family’s domain requirements 
3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, documents that comply with standard 
industrial templates, with support for presentation-quality output and in-built 
document quality controls 
3.3 Generate the complete specification, expressed using formal language (informal 
and semiformal languages might also be included), commonly agreed by all 
stakeholders 
6.5. Threats to Validity 
This experiment was conducted on the basis of personal experience gained using security 
engineering tool. The features were prioritized solely with the help of brainstorming and this 
may differ according to difference in needs or difference in experience. Most of the features in 
SETEF were derived using three security engineering tools, which compromises the future 
security engineering tools that may have different features.  
Additionally the tools were compared against requirements collected from SSAP’s in order to 
build the SETEF, where some of the requirements were out of scope because of limitations in 
capabilities in security engineering tools. For example requirements related to secure code, were 
neglected because security engineering tools do not support code related to requirements.  
6.6. Summary 
In Table  6-3 the comparison of both approaches is showing the result opposite from each other. 
The reason for this kind of behavior could be the difference in features. As R-TEA approach is 
more focused towards correct documentation of requirements and SETEF approach is more 
focused towards features instructiveness, the results will be opposite. Highest score is gained by 
SQUARE tool using R-TEA approach, and CORAS using SETEF approach.  
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In this chapter we have explained how the experiment was conducted using evaluation 
framework, and concluded that CORAS gained the highest points which make this tool to be 
chosen according to SETEF approach. See Table  6-4 for full tool evaluation results. In next 
chapter we will conclude this research work.  
Table ‎6-3 Framework Results Comparison 
 
Tool R-TEA 
CORAS 99 
SecTro2 102 
Magic Draw 110 
STS-TOOL 113 
SQUARE 167 
 
 
Tool SETEF 
SQUARE 75 
STS-TOOL 80 
SecTro2 80 
Magic Draw 99 
CORAS 109 
 
 
Table ‎6-4 Tool Evaluation Summary  
Tool R-TEA SETEF 
STS-TOOL 113 80 
CORAS 99 109 
SQUARE 167 75 
SecTro2 102 80 
Magic Draw 110 99 
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Conclusion and Future Work 
This research work was done to create a method/framework, which helps in choosing best 
security engineering tool. In this regards SSAP’s (SDL, 7 Touch points, and OWASP) were 
analyzed to gather common requirements secure software. These requirements were then tested 
against security engineering tools (CORAS, SecTro2 and SQUARE) to collect means to fulfill 
these requirements. These means however can be many but our focus was to collect most of 
which from the well-developed security engineering tools. These means were taken as the base 
for Security engineering tool evaluation framework (SETEF). SETEF can be used to evaluate the 
security engineering tools, and one can choose between tools and select the best one based on 
highest score.  
In conclusion if someone wants to evaluate security engineering tools using SETEF approach 
they might get different result based on the priorities they give to the features. But most 
appropriate results can only be obtained based on features an individual wants utmost. Moreover 
the features that we have elicited using SSAP’s have a tendency to change with the changing 
needs of the software security requirements. This also leaves the room for future development in 
this field.  
In this research work we also concluded that results using R-TEA approach were opposite to 
SETEF because R-TEA framework is more focused towards documentation part of requirements 
engineering. And in this research SQUARE tool is more focused towards documentation, which 
gives this tool the highest score using R-TEA approach. However using SETEF approach 
CORAS tool gets the highest score. Because using SETEF we have scored the features according 
to their interactive diagram and visualization. One can also score the features according to their 
priorities, but experiment conducted in previous chapter we have prioritized the features based 
on visualization.  
7 
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7.1. Limitations  
In this research we have evaluated the tools on the basis of priorities given by personal opinion 
and judgment, however these values can differ according to different analysts. These priorities 
are not concrete enough to provide actual results of the tool evaluation, which also leaves the 
room for future development in this perspective. Our conclusion was based on scores obtained 
by analyzing tools and calculating the base score from each activity, for which this also can be 
done using different statistical methods like: calculating the mean of priority features.  
One more addition to this work can be to make priorities more solid at the requirements level. As 
we have prioritized these features, researchers also can priorities requirements itself. For 
example how much value does the requirement SR001 contains over SR002.  
7.2. Future Work 
This framework contain requirements analyzed from SSAP’s, however these requirements can 
also be gathered by market research and following the current trend in security requirements 
gathering techniques, currently used within most of the companies. Asking questions like “what 
an analyst look for if he has to identify the assets” the answer to this question can be variant and 
diverse based on the expertise the market researcher has. And can provide various ides about 
techniques used in identifying assets. As oppose to task done in this thesis work, one can also try 
to analyze the development processes to analyze security constraints available. That can provide 
with various other terms to cater in regards to analyzing security engineering tools.  
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APPENDIX-A 
 
Table ‎9-1 CORAS Tool Artifacts 
 Category  Name Image 
C
O
R
A
S
 T
O
O
L
 A
R
T
IF
A
C
T
S
 
Connections Harm  
Impact  
Initiates  
Leads To  
Threats  
Vulnerability Target  
Legal Norm Target  
Basic CORAS Threat Scenario  
 
Direct Asset 
 
Indirect Asset 
 
Human Threat 
Accidental  
 
Human Threat 
Deliberate 
 
Non-Human Threat  
 
Risk 
 
Treatment Scenario 
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Unwanted Incident  
 
Vulnerability 
 
High Level CORAS Referring Risk 
 
Referring Threat 
Scenario  
 
Referring Treatment 
Scenario  
 
Referring Unwanted 
Incident  
 
Dependent CORAS Border  
 
 
 
Legal CORAS Legal Norm 
 
 Appendix A  
 
76  
 
 
Table ‎9-2 SecTro2 Tool Artifacts 
 Category  Name Image 
S
E
C
T
R
O
2
 T
O
O
L
 A
R
T
IF
A
C
T
S
 
Organizational view Organization 
 
Actor 
 
Goal 
 
Dependency link 
 
Security 
Requirements view  
ad 
Resource 
 
Plan 
 
Soft Goal 
 
Security Constraint 
 
Security Objective 
 
Security Mechanism  
 
Threat  
 
Means End  
Decomposition  
Contribution   
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Restricts 
 
Mitigates 
 
Satisfies 
 
Implement 
 
Impacts 
 
Creates 
 
Requires 
 
Protects 
 
And 
 
Security 
Components view 
Actor Lifeline 
 
Security Mechanism 
Lifeline  
 
Component Lifeline 
 
Activation Bar 
 
 Message Link 
 
 Return Message Link 
 
Security Attacks 
view  
Vulnerability 
 
Attack Method 
 
Attacks Link 
 
Affects Link 
 
Cloud Analysis 
view  
Cloud Actor 
 
Satisfiability Link 
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APPENDIX-B 
 
Results using R-TEA method 
Table ‎10-1 Calculated Results from STS-TOOL 
Activities of the Representation Dimension  
       
FEF1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using 
informal language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
113.00 
FEF1.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
natural language description for security? 
II/2 
        
4 
 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.1.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
specify unique identification (ID) for each 
separate requirement? 
I/3 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9 
 
 
FEF 1.1.3 To what extent this tool allows 
importing of requirements and their 
description from text document? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
13 
 
 
       
FEF1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal 
language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for semi-formal language 
description? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between semi-
formal informal and formal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
2 
 
 
      
8 
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FEF1.3 Specify requirements using formal languages 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for formal language description? 
I/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF1.3.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
formal and informal, semiformal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
      
2 
 
 
       
FEF1.4 Define traceable associations between 
requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.4.1 To what extent this tool provide 
functions for testing traceability between 
informal, semiformal, and formal 
requirement description? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.4.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
create parent Child traceable relations 
between requirements?  
I/5 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
10 
 
 
FEF1.4.3 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain peer-to-peer traceable relations 
between requirements? 
II/4 
        
8 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.4 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain traceable relations between various 
related information? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
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FEF1.4.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain forward/backward traceability 
between a source of requirements, the 
requirements and design? 
IV/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0            
 
 
     
24 
 
FEF1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and 
systems, by supporting interoperable protocols and 
standards 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
 
/Score 
 
FEF1.5.1 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting requirements 
description from text document? 
I/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.5.2 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting of requirements from 
graphical documents? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
4 
 Activities of Agreement Dimension 
       
FEF2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive 
baseline versions; and engage a mechanism to 
authenticate and approve change requests. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
maintainability of user authentication for the 
system? 
I/5 
        
10 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.1.2 To what extent this tool allows 
grouping of different users? 
II/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF2.1.3 To what extent this tool provides 
different views i.e. (documents, 
requirements, attributes) for different 
stakeholders? 
III/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.1.4 To what extent this tool allows 
changes/ history of requirements/ 
negotiation? 
IV/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0  
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FEF2.1.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
call earlier requirement description/versions 
and register them into history context? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
19.00 
 
FEF2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined 
groupings.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.2.1 To what extent this tool allows 
specifying attributes/properties of the 
requirement?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
sorting according to different 
attributes/properties? 
II/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 FEF2.2.3 To what extent this tool provides 
filtering according to different 
attributes/properties? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
9 
 
FEF2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work 
between members of a multidisciplinary team, which 
may be geographically distributed.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
independent interface for geographically 
distributed users? 
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.3.2 To what extent this tool allow 
making a copy for modification of an already 
approved version of requirements description 
in different abstract levels (document, 
requirement)? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.3.3 To what extent this tool provides 
change approval cycle for multiple change 
negotiation and approval before posting into 
common repository? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
3.00 
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FEF2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of 
all project components and requirements in a shared 
repository 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.4.1 To what extent this tool provides the 
single repository or data and concept 
dictionary? 
II/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.2 To what extent this tool provide 
separate data dictionaries for non-technical 
users and technical users? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.4.3 To what extent this tool provides the 
help system to the user? 
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
11.00 
 Activities of the specification Dimension 
       
FEF3.1 Collect and store a common system's and a 
product family's domain requirements. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.1.1 To what extent this tool enable 
selection and extraction of common domain 
requirements and requirements which 
differentiate systems in product line? 
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.2 To what extent this tool incorporate 
requirements to a concrete project? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.1.3 To what extent this tool 
adapt/spread changes in domain 
requirements to concrete projects within 
domain? 
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.4 To what extent this tool provides 
comparison of domain requirements 
feasibility? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 
 Appendix B  
 
83  
 
FEF3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, 
documents that comply with standard industrial 
templates, with support for presentation-quality 
output and in-built document quality controls. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
wizards for report generation?  
I/4 
        
12 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF3.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
possibility to print report according to views 
and sorting? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.3 To what extent this tool provide 
possibility to print results of rationale, 
brainstorm and etc.?  
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.4 To what extent this tool provides 
techniques for error checking? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
12.00 
 
FEF3.3 Generate the complete specification, expressed 
using formal language (informal and semiformal 
languages might also be included), commonly agreed 
by all stakeholders. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.3.1 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards of software documentation? 
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.3.2 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards defined by an organization? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.3.3 To what extent this tool support 
formal languages for complete, commonly 
agreed requirements specification? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
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Table ‎10-2 Calculated Results from CORAS Tool 
Activities of the Representation 
Dimension  
       
FEF1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using 
informal language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
99.00 
FEF1.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
natural language description for security? 
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF 1.1.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
specify unique identification (ID) for each 
separate requirement? 
I/3 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9 
 
 
FEF 1.1.3 To what extent this tool allows 
importing of requirements and their 
description from text document? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
15 
 
 
       
FEF1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal 
language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  FEF1.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for semi-formal language 
description? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF 1.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
semi-formal informal and formal 
description?  
II/1 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
2 
 
 
      
8 
 
 
       
FEF1.3 Specify requirements using formal languages 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for formal language description? 
I/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 FEF1.3.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
formal and informal, semiformal 
description?  
II/1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
      
2 
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       FEF1.4 Define traceable associations between 
requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.4.1 To what extent this tool provide 
functions for testing traceability between 
informal, semiformal, and formal 
requirement description? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.4.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
create parent Child traceable relations 
between requirements?  
I/5 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
10 
 
 
FEF1.4.3 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain peer-to-peer traceable relations 
between requirements? 
II/4 
        
8 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.4 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain traceable relations between 
various related information? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain forward/backward traceability 
between a source of requirements, the 
requirements and design? 
IV/2 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ 
4 
 
          
 
 
     
28 
 FEF1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and 
systems, by supporting interoperable protocols and 
standards 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
 
/Score 
 
FEF1.5.1 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting requirements 
description from text document? 
I/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.5.2 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting of requirements from 
graphical documents? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Activities of Agreement Dimension 
       FEF2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive Priority Full Above Minimal No 
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baseline versions; and engage a mechanism to 
authenticate and approve change requests. /Score 
Support Average 
Support 
Support  Support 
 FEF2.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
maintainability of user authentication for the 
system? 
I/5 
        
15 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.2 To what extent this tool allows 
grouping of different users? 
II/4 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF2.1.3 To what extent this tool provides 
different views i.e. (documents, 
requirements, attributes) for different 
stakeholders? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.4 To what extent this tool allows 
changes/ history of requirements/ 
negotiation? 
IV/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.1.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
call earlier requirement description/versions 
and register them into history context? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
21.00 
 
FEF2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined 
groupings.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.2.1 To what extent this tool allows 
specifying attributes/properties of the 
requirement?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
sorting according to different 
attributes/properties? 
II/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.2.3 To what extent this tool provides 
filtering according to different 
attributes/properties? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
9 
 FEF2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work 
between members of a multidisciplinary team, which 
may be geographically distributed.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  FEF2.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
independent interface for geographically 
distributed users? 
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 FEF2.3.2 To what extent this tool allow II/2         0 
 
 Appendix B  
 
87  
 
making a copy for modification of an already 
approved version of requirements 
description in different abstract levels 
(document, requirement)? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.3.3 To what extent this tool provides 
change approval cycle for multiple change 
negotiation and approval before posting into 
common repository? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
3.00 
 FEF2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of 
all project components and requirements in a shared 
repository 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.4.1 To what extent this tool provides 
the single repository or data and concept 
dictionary? 
II/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.2 To what extent this tool provide 
separate data dictionaries for non-technical 
users and technical users? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.4.3 To what extent this tool provides 
the help system to the user? 
I/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
2.00 
 Activities of the specification Dimension 
       
FEF3.1 Collect and store a common system's and a 
product family's domain requirements. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support   /Score 
  
FEF3.1.1 To what extent this tool enable 
selection and extraction of common domain 
requirements and requirements which 
differentiate systems in product line? 
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.2 To what extent this tool 
incorporate requirements to a concrete 
project? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.1.3 To what extent this tool III/2         0 
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adapt/spread changes in domain 
requirements to concrete projects within 
domain? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.4 To what extent this tool provides 
comparison of domain requirements 
feasibility? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 
FEF3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, 
documents that comply with standard industrial 
templates, with support for presentation-quality 
output and in-built document quality controls. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  FEF3.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
wizards for report generation?  
I/4 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
possibility to print report according to views 
and sorting? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.3 To what extent this tool provide 
possibility to print results of rationale, 
brainstorm and etc.?  
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.4 To what extent this tool provides 
techniques for error checking? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 FEF3.3 Generate the complete specification, 
expressed using formal language (informal and 
semiformal languages might also be included), 
commonly agreed by all stakeholders. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.3.1 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards of software documentation? 
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.3.2 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards defined by an organization? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.3.3 To what extent this tool support 
formal languages for complete, commonly 
agreed requirements specification? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
11.00 
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Table ‎10-3 Calculated Results from SQUARE Tool 
Activities of the Representation Dimension  
       
FEF1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using 
informal language 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
167.00 
FEF1.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
natural language description for security? 
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.1.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
specify unique identification (ID) for each 
separate requirement? 
I/3 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9 
 
 
FEF 1.1.3 To what extent this tool allows 
importing of requirements and their 
description from text document? 
III/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
18 
 
 
       
FEF1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal 
language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for semi-formal language 
description? 
I/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF 1.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
semi-formal informal and formal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
      
0 
 
 
       
FEF1.3 Specify requirements using formal languages 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for formal language description? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF1.3.2 To what extent this tool provides II/1 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 2 
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forward/backward traceability between 
formal and informal, semiformal description?  
 
      
8 
 
 
       
FEF1.4 Define traceable associations between 
requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.4.1 To what extent this tool provide 
functions for testing traceability between 
informal, semiformal, and formal 
requirement description? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.4.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
create parent Child traceable relations 
between requirements?  
I/5 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
10 
 
 
FEF1.4.3 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain peer-to-peer traceable relations 
between requirements? 
II/4 
        
8 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF1.4.4 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain traceable relations between various 
related information? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain forward/backward traceability 
between a source of requirements, the 
requirements and design? 
IV/2 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
4 
 
          
 
 
     
28 
 
FEF1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and 
systems, by supporting interoperable protocols and 
standards 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
 
/Score 
 
FEF1.5.1 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting requirements 
description from text document? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF1.5.2 To what extent this tool allows II/1         0 
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importing/exporting of requirements from 
graphical documents? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
 Activities of Agreement Dimension 
       
FEF2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive 
baseline versions; and engage a mechanism to 
authenticate and approve change requests. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
maintainability of user authentication for the 
system? 
I/5 
        
10 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.2 To what extent this tool allows 
grouping of different users? 
II/4 
        
0 
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.1.3 To what extent this tool provides 
different views i.e. (documents, 
requirements, attributes) for different 
stakeholders? 
III/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF2.1.4 To what extent this tool allows 
changes/ history of requirements/ 
negotiation? 
IV/2 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
4 
 
 
FEF2.1.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
call earlier requirement description/versions 
and register them into history context? 
V/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
     
16.00 
 
FEF2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined 
groupings.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 FEF2.2.1 To what extent this tool allows 
specifying attributes/properties of the 
requirement?  
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
sorting according to different 
attributes/properties? 
II/2 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6 
 
 FEF2.2.3 To what extent this tool provides 
filtering according to different 
attributes/properties? 
III/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
     
15 
 
 Appendix B  
 
92  
 
FEF2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work 
between members of a multidisciplinary team, which 
may be geographically distributed.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
independent interface for geographically 
distributed users? 
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.3.2 To what extent this tool allow 
making a copy for modification of an already 
approved version of requirements 
description in different abstract levels 
(document, requirement)? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.3.3 To what extent this tool provides 
change approval cycle for multiple change 
negotiation and approval before posting into 
common repository? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
3.00 
 FEF2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of 
all project components and requirements in a shared 
repository 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.4.1 To what extent this tool provides 
the single repository or data and concept 
dictionary? 
II/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.2 To what extent this tool provide 
separate data dictionaries for non-technical 
users and technical users? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.4.3 To what extent this tool provides 
the help system to the user? 
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
      
5.00 
 Activities of the specification Dimension 
       
FEF3.1 Collect and store a common system's and a 
product family's domain requirements. 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support   /Score 
  FEF3.1.1 To what extent this tool enable I/4         8 
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selection and extraction of common domain 
requirements and requirements which 
differentiate systems in product line? ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.1.2 To what extent this tool incorporate 
requirements to a concrete project? 
II/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF3.1.3 To what extent this tool 
adapt/spread changes in domain 
requirements to concrete projects within 
domain? 
III/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 FEF3.1.4 To what extent this tool provides 
comparison of domain requirements 
feasibility? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
13.00 
 FEF3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, 
documents that comply with standard industrial 
templates, with support for presentation-quality 
output and in-built document quality controls. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
wizards for report generation?  
I/4 
        
12 
 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
possibility to print report according to views 
and sorting? 
II/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.2.3 To what extent this tool provide 
possibility to print results of rationale, 
brainstorm and etc.?  
III/2 
        
26 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF3.2.4 To what extent this tool provides 
techniques for error checking? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
47.00 
 FEF3.3 Generate the complete specification, expressed 
using formal language (informal and semiformal 
languages might also be included), commonly agreed 
by all stakeholders. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.3.1 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards of software documentation? 
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF3.3.2 To what extent this tool correspond II/2         0 
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to standards defined by an organization? 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.3.3 To what extent this tool support 
formal languages for complete, commonly 
agreed requirements specification? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
  
Table ‎10-4 Calculated Results from SecTro2 Tool 
Activities of the Representation Dimension  
       
FEF1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using 
informal language 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
102.00 
FEF1.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
natural language description for security? 
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.1.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
specify unique identification (ID) for each 
separate requirement? 
I/3 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9 
 
 
FEF 1.1.3 To what extent this tool allows 
importing of requirements and their 
description from text document? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
15 
 
 
       
FEF1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal 
language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  FEF1.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for semi-formal language 
description? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
semi-formal informal and formal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
2 
 
 
      
8 
 
 
       
FEF1.3 Specify requirements using formal languages 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support   /Score 
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Support 
FEF1.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for formal language description? 
I/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF1.3.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
formal and informal, semiformal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
      
2 
 
 
       
FEF1.4 Define traceable associations between 
requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.4.1 To what extent this tool provide 
functions for testing traceability between 
informal, semiformal, and formal 
requirement description? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF1.4.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
create parent Child traceable relations 
between requirements?  
I/5 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
10 
 
 
FEF1.4.3 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain peer-to-peer traceable relations 
between requirements? 
II/4 
        
8 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.4 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain traceable relations between various 
related information? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain forward/backward traceability 
between a source of requirements, the 
requirements and design? 
IV/2 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
4 
 
          
 
 
     
28 
 FEF1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and 
systems, by supporting interoperable protocols and 
standards 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
 
/Score 
 FEF1.5.1 To what extent this tool allows I/2         0 
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importing/exporting requirements 
description from text document? ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.5.2 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting of requirements from 
graphical documents? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Activities of Agreement Dimension 
       
FEF2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive 
baseline versions; and engage a mechanism to 
authenticate and approve change requests. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
maintainability of user authentication for the 
system? 
I/5 
        
15 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.1.2 To what extent this tool allows 
grouping of different users? 
II/4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.1.3 To what extent this tool provides 
different views i.e. (documents, 
requirements, attributes) for different 
stakeholders? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.4 To what extent this tool allows 
changes/ history of requirements/ 
negotiation? 
IV/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.1.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
call earlier requirement description/versions 
and register them into history context? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
21.00 
 
FEF2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined 
groupings.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.2.1 To what extent this tool allows 
specifying attributes/properties of the 
requirement?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.2.2 To what extent this tool provides II/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 0 
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sorting according to different 
attributes/properties? 
 
FEF2.2.3 To what extent this tool provides 
filtering according to different 
attributes/properties? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
9 
 
FEF2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work 
between members of a multidisciplinary team, which 
may be geographically distributed.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF2.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
independent interface for geographically 
distributed users? 
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.3.2 To what extent this tool allow 
making a copy for modification of an already 
approved version of requirements 
description in different abstract levels 
(document, requirement)? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF2.3.3 To what extent this tool provides 
change approval cycle for multiple change 
negotiation and approval before posting into 
common repository? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
3.00 
 FEF2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of 
all project components and requirements in a shared 
repository 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  FEF2.4.1 To what extent this tool provides 
the single repository or data and concept 
dictionary? 
II/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.2 To what extent this tool provide 
separate data dictionaries for non-technical 
users and technical users? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF2.4.3 To what extent this tool provides 
the help system to the user? 
I/3 
        
6 
 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
 Activities of the specification Dimension 
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FEF3.1 Collect and store a common system's and a 
product family's domain requirements. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support   /Score 
  
FEF3.1.1 To what extent this tool enable 
selection and extraction of common domain 
requirements and requirements which 
differentiate systems in product line? 
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.2 To what extent this tool incorporate 
requirements to a concrete project? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.1.3 To what extent this tool 
adapt/spread changes in domain 
requirements to concrete projects within 
domain? 
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.4 To what extent this tool provides 
comparison of domain requirements 
feasibility? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 FEF3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, 
documents that comply with standard industrial 
templates, with support for presentation-quality 
output and in-built document quality controls. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
wizards for report generation?  
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
possibility to print report according to views 
and sorting? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.2.3 To what extent this tool provide 
possibility to print results of rationale, 
brainstorm and etc.?  
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.4 To what extent this tool provides 
techniques for error checking? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 FEF3.3 Generate the complete specification, expressed 
using formal language (informal and semiformal 
languages might also be included), commonly agreed 
by all stakeholders. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
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FEF3.3.1 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards of software documentation? 
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.3.2 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards defined by an organization? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.3.3 To what extent this tool support 
formal languages for complete, commonly 
agreed requirements specification? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
  
Table ‎10-5 Calculated Results from Magic Draw Tool 
Activities of the Representation Dimension  
       
FEF1.1 Specify uniquely identifiable description using 
informal language 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
110.00 
FEF1.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
natural language description for security? 
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF 1.1.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
specify unique identification (ID) for each 
separate requirement? 
I/3 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9 
 
 
FEF 1.1.3 To what extent this tool allows 
importing of requirements and their 
description from text document? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
15 
 
 
       
FEF1.2 Specify requirements using semi-formal 
language 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for semi-formal language 
description? 
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF 1.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between semi-
formal informal and formal description?  
II/1 ☒ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
3 
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9 
 
 
       
FEF1.3 Specify requirements using formal languages 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
FEF1.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
support for formal language description? 
I/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF1.3.2 To what extent this tool provides 
forward/backward traceability between 
formal and informal, semiformal description?  
II/1 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
2 
 
 
      
6 
 
 
       
FEF1.4 Define traceable associations between 
requirements and the different elements of 
requirements specification 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF1.4.1 To what extent this tool provide 
functions for testing traceability between 
informal, semiformal, and formal 
requirement description? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF1.4.2 To what extent this tool allows to 
create parent Child traceable relations 
between requirements?  
I/5 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
10 
 
 
FEF1.4.3 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain peer-to-peer traceable relations 
between requirements? 
II/4 
        
8 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.4 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain traceable relations between various 
related information? 
III/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF1.4.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
maintain forward/backward traceability 
between a source of requirements, the 
requirements and design? 
IV/2 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
4 
 
          
 
 
     
31 
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FEF1.5 Connect seamlessly with other tools and 
systems, by supporting interoperable protocols and 
standards 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
 
/Score 
 
FEF1.5.1 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting requirements 
description from text document? 
I/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF1.5.2 To what extent this tool allows 
importing/exporting of requirements from 
graphical documents? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Activities of Agreement Dimension 
       
FEF2.1 Maintain an audit trail of changes, archive 
baseline versions; and engage a mechanism to 
authenticate and approve change requests. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 
FEF2.1.1 To what extent this tool provides 
maintainability of user authentication for the 
system? 
I/5 
        
10 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.2 To what extent this tool allows 
grouping of different users? 
II/4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0  
 
FEF2.1.3 To what extent this tool provides 
different views i.e. (documents, 
requirements, attributes) for different 
stakeholders? 
III/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 FEF2.1.4 To what extent this tool allows 
changes/ history of requirements/ 
negotiation? 
IV/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.1.5 To what extent this tool allows to 
call earlier requirement description/versions 
and register them into history context? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
16.00 
 
FEF2.2 Classify requirements into logical user defined 
groupings.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
 
 
/Score 
 FEF2.2.1 To what extent this tool allows 
specifying attributes/properties of the 
requirement?  
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
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FEF2.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
sorting according to different 
attributes/properties? 
II/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.2.3 To what extent this tool provides 
filtering according to different 
attributes/properties? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
6 
 FEF2.3 Support secure, concurrent cooperative work 
between members of a multidisciplinary team, which 
may be geographically distributed.  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  FEF2.3.1 To what extent this tool provides 
independent interface for geographically 
distributed users? 
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.3.2 To what extent this tool allow 
making a copy for modification of an already 
approved version of requirements description 
in different abstract levels (document, 
requirement)? 
II/2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
0 
 
 
FEF2.3.3 To what extent this tool provides 
change approval cycle for multiple change 
negotiation and approval before posting into 
common repository? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
 
     
6.00 
 FEF2.4 Maintain a comprehensive data dictionary of 
all project components and requirements in a shared 
repository 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  FEF2.4.1 To what extent this tool provides the 
single repository or data and concept 
dictionary? 
II/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.2 To what extent this tool provide 
separate data dictionaries for non-technical 
users and technical users? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF2.4.3 To what extent this tool provides the 
help system to the user? 
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
13.00 
 Activities of the specification Dimension 
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FEF3.1 Collect and store a common system's and a 
product family's domain requirements. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support   /Score 
  
FEF3.1.1 To what extent this tool enable 
selection and extraction of common domain 
requirements and requirements which 
differentiate systems in product line? 
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.2 To what extent this tool incorporate 
requirements to a concrete project? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.1.3 To what extent this tool 
adapt/spread changes in domain 
requirements to concrete projects within 
domain? 
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.1.4 To what extent this tool provides 
comparison of domain requirements 
feasibility? 
V/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 
FEF3.2 Generate predefined and ad hoc reports, 
documents that comply with standard industrial 
templates, with support for presentation-quality 
output and in-built document quality controls. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
  
FEF3.2.1 To what extent this tool provides 
wizards for report generation?  
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.2.2 To what extent this tool provides 
possibility to print report according to views 
and sorting? 
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 FEF3.2.3 To what extent this tool provide 
possibility to print results of rationale, 
brainstorm and etc.?  
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.2.4 To what extent this tool provides 
techniques for error checking? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0.00 
 FEF3.3 Generate the complete specification, expressed 
using formal language (informal and semiformal 
languages might also be included), commonly agreed 
by all stakeholders. 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  
/Score 
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FEF3.3.1 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards of software documentation? 
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
FEF3.3.2 To what extent this tool correspond 
to standards defined by an organization? 
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
FEF3.3.3 To what extent this tool support 
formal languages for complete, commonly 
agreed requirements specification? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
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APPENDIX-C 
Below are the results and the score of security engineering tools evaluation using method 
constructed in this research.  
Table ‎11-1 Calculated Results for STS-TOOL 
Table ‎0-1 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
       
Sample questions 
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score Total Score 
/Score 
 
80 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and documentation? 
I/6 
        
18  ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tools’ book on 
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5 
        
5 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
the user manual? 
III/4 
        
12 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides tutorials? 
That will support and provide learning 
opportunity.  
IV/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool has gained popularity 
to support and provide several publications?  
V/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
hands on wizards? These will guide engineers 
through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
48 
 Table ‎0-2 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context 
and Assets 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create asset diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare assets in efficient 
way?  
I/3 
        
9  ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that includes a template to document assets 
and goals?  
II/2 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create checklist of assets and goals?    
III/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-3 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create treatment diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare treatments 
in efficient way?  
I/3 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting security requirements 
elicitation techniques?   
II/2 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports template to 
document security requirements?  
III/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-4 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create risk diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare risks in efficient 
way?    
I/4 
        
12  ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create threat diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare threats in efficient 
way?   
II/3 
        
9  ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports template to 
document risks?  
III/2 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create checklist of vulnerabilities, security 
threats and risks? 
IV/1         
0 
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☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
21 
 Table ‎0-5 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design 
Practices 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create security mechanism, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare security 
mechanism in efficient way?   
I/2 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting secure software 
architecture and secure software design? 
II/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-6 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk estimations?  
I/3 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help categorizing and prioritizing security 
requirements?  
II/2 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports mechanism 
to estimate trade-off analysis? 
III/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-7 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
       
Sample questions  
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
  /Score 
  
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help creating response plan?  
I/2         
2 
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☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create templates for security requirements 
inspection?  
II/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
2 
  
Table ‎11-2 Calculated Results for CORAS TOOL 
Table ‎0-1 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
       
Sample questions 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
109.00 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and documentation? 
I/6 
        
18 
 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tools’ book on 
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5 
        
15 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides support for 
the user manual? 
III/4 
        
4 
 ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides tutorials? 
That will support and provide learning 
opportunity.  
IV/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool has gained popularity 
to support and provide several publications?  
V/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
hands on wizards? These will guide engineers 
through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
50.00 
 Table ‎0-2 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context 
and Assets 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To which extent this tool supports the feature I/3         9 
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to create asset diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare assets in efficient 
way?  
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that includes a template to document assets 
and goals?  
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create checklist of assets and goals?    
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-3 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create treatment diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare treatments 
in efficient way?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting security requirements 
elicitation techniques?   
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports template to 
document security requirements?  
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-4 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create risk diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare risks in efficient 
way?    
I/4 
        
12 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create threat diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare threats in efficient 
way?   
II/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports templates to III/2         0 
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document risks?  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create checklist of vulnerabilities, security 
threats and risks? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
21 
 Table ‎0-5 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design 
Practices 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create security mechanism, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare security 
mechanism in efficient way?   
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting secure software 
architecture and secure software design? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
 Table ‎0-6 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk estimations?  
I/3 
        
6 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help categorizing and prioritizing security 
requirements?  
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports mechanism 
to estimate trade-off analysis? 
III/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
8.00 
 Table ‎0-7 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To what extent this tool supports feature that I/2         6 
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can help creating response plan?  
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create templates for security requirements 
inspection?  
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
  
Table ‎11-3 Calculated Results for SQUARE TOOL 
Table ‎0-1 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
       
Sample questions 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
75.00 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and documentation? 
I/6 
        
12 
 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tools’ book on 
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5 
        
5 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides support for 
the user manual? 
III/4 
        
0 
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool provides tutorials? 
That will support and provide learning 
opportunity.  
IV/3 
        
9 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool has gained popularity 
to support and provide several publications?  
V/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
hands on wizards? These will guide engineers 
through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
33.00 
 Table ‎0-2 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context 
and Assets 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To which extent this tool supports the feature I/3         3 
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to create asset diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare assets in efficient 
way?  
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that includes a template to document assets 
and goals?  
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create checklist of assets and goals?    
III/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
12 
 Table ‎0-3 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create treatment diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare treatments 
in efficient way?  
I/3 
        
3 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting security requirements 
elicitation techniques?   
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports template to 
document security requirements?  
III/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
12 
 Table ‎0-4 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create risk diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare risks in efficient 
way?    
I/4 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create threat diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare threats in efficient 
way?   
II/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports template to III/2         6 
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document risks?  
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create checklist of vulnerabilities, security 
threats and risks? 
IV/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-5 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design 
Practices 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create security mechanism, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare security 
mechanism in efficient way?   
I/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting secure software 
architecture and secure software design? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-6 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk estimations?  
I/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help categorizing and prioritizing security 
requirements?  
II/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports mechanism 
to estimate trade-off analysis? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6.00 
 Table ‎0-7 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
       Sample questions  Priority Full Above Minimal No 
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/Score 
Support Average 
Support 
Support  Support 
  
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help creating response plan?  
I/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create templates for security requirements 
inspection?  
II/1 
        
3 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
3 
  
Table ‎11-4 Calculated Results for SecTro2 TOOL 
Table ‎0-1 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
       
Sample questions 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
80.00 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and documentation? 
I/6 
        
12 
 ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tools’ book on 
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5 
        
5 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides support for 
the user manual? 
III/4 
        
12 
 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides tutorials? 
That will support and provide learning 
opportunity.  
IV/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool has gained popularity 
to support and provide several publications?  
V/2 
        
4 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
hands on wizards? These will guide engineers 
through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
33.00 
 Table ‎0-2 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context 
and Assets 
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Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create asset diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare assets in efficient 
way?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that includes a template to document assets 
and goals?  
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create checklist of assets and goals?    
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-3 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create treatment diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare treatments 
in efficient way?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting security requirements 
elicitation techniques?   
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports template to 
document security requirements?  
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-4 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To which extent this tool supports feature to I/4         12 
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create risk diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare risks in efficient 
way?    
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create threat diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare threats in efficient 
way?   
II/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports template to 
document risks?  
III/2 
        
0 
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create checklist of vulnerabilities, security 
threats and risks? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
21 
 Table ‎0-5 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design 
Practices 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create security mechanism, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare security 
mechanism in efficient way?   
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting secure software 
architecture and secure software design? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
 Table ‎0-6 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk estimations?  
I/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help categorizing and prioritizing security 
requirements?  
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
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To what extent this tool supports mechanism 
to estimate trade-off analysis? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-7 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help creating response plan?  
I/2 
        
2 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create templates for security requirements 
inspection?  
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
2 
  
Table ‎11-5 Calculated Results for Magic Draw TOOL 
Table ‎0-1 Likert Scale for SR001-Making Awareness 
       
Sample questions 
Priority Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support 
Score 
Total 
Score 
/Score 
 
99.00 
To which extent this tool provides online 
support, e.g. downloads and documentation? 
I/6 
        
18 
 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tools’ book on 
methodology is explained and/or to what 
extent this tool adapts the methodology?  
II/5 
        
5 
 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides support for 
the user manual? 
III/4 
        
12 
 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool provides tutorials? 
That will support and provide learning 
opportunity.  
IV/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool has gained popularity V/2         2 
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to support and provide several publications?  
☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool provides support for 
hands on wizards? These will guide engineers 
through several aspects of tool?  
VI/1 
        
2 
 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
 
      
48.00 
 Table ‎0-2 Likert Scale for SR002-Understand Context 
and Assets 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create asset diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare assets in efficient 
way?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that includes a template to document assets 
and goals?  
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create checklist of assets and goals?    
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-3 Likert Scale for SR003-Security Requirements 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create treatment diagram, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare treatments 
in efficient way?  
I/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting security requirements 
elicitation techniques?   
II/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports template to 
document security requirements?  
III/1 
        
0  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
9 
 Table ‎0-4 Likert Scale for SR004-Risk Analysis 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  To which extent this tool supports feature to I/4         12 
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create risk diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare risks in efficient 
way?    
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 To which extent this tool supports feature to 
create threat diagram, or at-least include a 
feature similar to declare threats in efficient 
way?   
II/3 
        
9 
 
☒ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports template to 
document risks?  
III/2 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create checklist of vulnerabilities, security 
threats and risks? 
IV/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
21 
 Table ‎0-5 Likert Scale for SR005-Secure Design 
Practices 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports the feature 
to create security mechanism, or at-least 
include a feature similar to declare security 
mechanism in efficient way?   
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports the feature 
that can help selecting secure software 
architecture and secure software design? 
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
 Table ‎0-6 Likert Scale for SR006-Justify Design Solution 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To which extent this tool supports feature 
that can help calculating risk estimations?  
I/3 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 To what extent this tool supports feature that II/2         0 
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can help categorizing and prioritizing security 
requirements?  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
To what extent this tool supports mechanism 
to estimate trade-off analysis? 
III/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
0 
 Table ‎0-7 Likert Scale for SR007-Response 
       
Sample questions  
Priority 
Full 
Support 
Above 
Average 
Support 
Minimal 
Support  
No 
Support  
 
/Score 
  
To what extent this tool supports feature that 
can help creating response plan?  
I/2 
        
6 
 
☒ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
 
To what extent this tool supports feature to 
create templates for security requirements 
inspection?  
II/1 
        
0 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
 
      
6 
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